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I. INTRODUCTION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 1 signed into law on
March 23, 2010, promises to increase access to health care for millions
of Americans, but does not entirely resolve the continuing problem of
cost. The new law will swiftly and dramatically alter the market
dynamics for people who need health insurance, making it much easier
for them to purchase coverage; yet, it fails to create any mechanism to
absolutely curtail government or private sector spending. The cost of
the healthcare system presents legal and social challenges requiring the
attention of legal scholars, particularly in a manner tailored to address
the challenges that the changing system presents.
The U.S. economy has absorbed escalating healthcare costs for
decades, even as the country has historically failed to provide access to
necessary care for many of its citizens, doing far worse than many
countries that spend far less. 2 In 2009, the cost of the healthcare system
in the United States was about $2.5 trillion, up 5.7% from the previous
year 3 —17.3% of the entire Gross Domestic Product. 4 By 2019, this cost
is projected to reach $4.5 trillion, 5 19.3% of the Gross Domestic
Product. 6 Costs continue to rise far above what any other country
spends per capita. 7 Lack of access to health care can be lethal, 8 and
1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
2. According to the United States Census Bureau, 15% of Americans did not have health
insurance in 2008, more than 46 million people. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty
and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2008 (Sept. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/income_wealth/cb09-141.html. See also CARMEN
DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008, 57–67 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2009pubs/p60-236.pdf.
3. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2009–2019 (2009), available at https://www.cms.gov/
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2009.pdf [hereinafter NHEP].
4. Id. In 2008, healthcare expenditures were 16.2% of gross domestic products (GDP). Id.
This 1.1% increase in percentage of GDP spent on health care is the greatest single year increase in U.S.
history. Id.
5. Id. tbl.3.
6. Id.
7. Press Release, World Health Org., World Health Organization Assesses the World’s Health
Systems (2010), http://www.who.int/whr/2000/media_centre/press_release/en/index.html. See also
WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000: HEALTH SYSTEMS: IMPROVING
PERFORMANCE 155 (2000), available at http://www.who.int/whr/2000/en/whr00_en.pdf (ranking the
United States first in spending per capita among 191 countries) [hereinafter WHO REPORT]. As one can
easily imagine, the WHO 2000 ranking is subject to criticism. See Carl Bialik, Ill-Conceived Ranking
Makes for Unhealthy Debate: In the Wrangle Over Health Care, a Low Rating for the U.S. System
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there is cause for hope that the increased access promised by the Patient
Protection Act will go a long way toward reducing these preventable
harms. However, while increased access will improve many aspects of
the current system, including the overall value it acquires for dollars
spent, the Patient Protection Act is not likely, by itself, to end current
cost concerns.
Costs place an extraordinary, distorting pressure on the healthcare
system. While the political system dictates the content of laws, cost
often shapes how these laws are implemented. This Article looks
closely at this dynamic in the Medicare system, but also attempts to
create a blueprint for further critical study of the broader problem’s
effect on the institutions that health law seeks to regulate. This is
especially important as the United States creates a massive regulatory
framework to implement the new healthcare laws. There are flaws in
the current healthcare system, driven into being by unspoken cost
concerns, which have long gone unremarked upon by legal scholars. A
new regulatory framework that fails to take this dynamic into account
risks entrenching the same problems—its authors carrying the sins of
this generation into the next.
A driving force in increasing medical expenditures is the cost of new
medical technologies, drugs, and procedures provided to persons who
have health insurance. 9
People with insurance consume an
extraordinary amount of healthcare resources per person, far more than
is reflected in the simple per capita cost of health care, which averages
costs across all persons, insured and uninsured alike. This needs to be
limited. Nevertheless, the clamorous public debate over health care
leading to passage of the new healthcare legislation beyond calling for
increased studies about efficacy and waste was silent about setting limits
Keeps Emerging Despite Evident Shortcomings in Study, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2009, at A19, available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125608054324397621.html.
8. The Institute of Medicine, in a report from 2002, found that lack of health insurance caused
at least 18,000 deaths each year. INST. OF MED., INSURING AMERICA’S HEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 8 (2004). While this study was based on data collected in 1993, an academic study
from 2009 found that “lack of health insurance is associated with as many as 44,789 deaths per year in
the United States.” Andrew P. Wilper et al., Health Insurance and Mortality in US Adults, 99 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 2289, 2295 (2009).
9. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., U.S. Health Care Costs, http://www.kaiseredu.org/IssueModules/US-Health-Care-Costs/Background-Brief.aspx (last visited Aug. 26, 2010) (citing Growth in
Health Care Costs: Before the Comm. on the Budget U.S. Senate (2008) (statement of Peter R. Orszag,
Dir., Cong. Budget Office)). See also id. (“[S]pending on prescription drugs has decelerated. Some
analysts state that the availability of more expensive, state-of-the-art technological services and new
drugs fuel healthcare spending not only because the development costs of these products must be
recouped by industry but also because they generate consumer demand for more intense, costly services
even if they are not necessarily cost-effective.” (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE AND THE GROWTH OF HEALTH CARE SPENDING (2008))).
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on spending for expensive new medical treatments, particularly for those
covered by Medicare.
The normative implications of rationing health care have been
exhaustively discussed in academic literature from many disciplines,
including health policy, law, philosophy, and bioethics. While no clear
consensus has emerged as to what the proper goals of a just system are
(or how a society goes about achieving such a system), and while
substantive work remains to be done in this field, there are looming
problems in the non-ideal world that beg for the legal academy to begin
focusing its energy in a different direction. Given the escalating cost of
new medical technologies, for example, the question emerges as to how
current payment structures grapple with cost pressures in the context of
the laws that govern them. This form of critical analysis has a twofold
focus, assessing both whether current laws can be utilized to reduce cost
and whether any resulting cost reductions are legitimately achieved.
Medicare is the single largest health care benefits provider in the
country, 10 and its decisions have a broad effect on the entire United
States healthcare system. In 2009, Medicare spent $507 billion, 11
covering 46 million people. 12 While more than 150 million Americans
have private insurance 13 spread across many insurers, and another 33.2
million are enrolled in Medicaid programs, 14 no other single insurance
plan covers as many people—or spends as many dollars—as Medicare.
As Medicare’s costs spin out of control, a hidden rationing problem
has developed where Medicare considers the cost of new treatments
when deciding whether to cover them, but does so in an undemocratic
way that is not transparent nor subject to direct public response. While
Medicare is under enormous pressure to control costs, it resorts to
hidden rationing, because Congress has refused to give it statutory
power to consider costs in deciding whether to cover expensive new
medical technologies. These important coverage decisions are made by
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), a federal

10. Medicare is the federal program that provides medical benefits to people over the age of
sixty-five and to the disabled. Health Insurance for the Aged Act (Medicare Act), Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79
Stat. 286 (1965).
11. See NHEP, supra note 3, at 1.
12. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE AT A GLANCE 1 (2010),
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/1066-12.pdf.
13. JOHN HOLAHAN & ALLISON COOK, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., CHANGES IN
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, 2007–2008: EARLY IMPACT OF THE RECESSION 2 fig.1 (2009),
available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/8004.pdf.
14. Id. fig.2. Medicaid is the combined federal and state program that provides health benefits
for those with low incomes. See Medicaid Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343
(2008).
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agency in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
Funding for CMS comes from two politically sensitive sources—payroll
tax revenues allocated by Congress and premiums paid by Medicare
recipients.
CMS has a process by which it makes National Coverage
Determinations (NCDs) to decide whether to cover particularly
expensive new technologies, and the problem discussed in this Article
occurs here. Even as the potential cost-benefit ratio of technology can
legally justify the issuance of an NCD, the Medicare Act prohibits cost
to shape the actual NCD issued by CMS. CMS often flatly denies that
cost impacts its specific decisions, 15 yet its management continually
stresses the importance of cost control. 16 As a result of these conflicting
messages, and in light of CMS’s actual decisions, it has become an
“open secret” in health policy that CMS considers cost when issuing
NCDs. 17
This Article argues that Medicare needs to be changed, giving CMS
the power and obligation to openly consider the cost of new medical
treatments before covering them. Doing so will yield two distinct
benefits. First, such a change will give CMS legitimate power to more
effectively lower Medicare’s costs. Unless CMS is formally empowered
to consider costs as well as benefits of new medical treatments in its
NCDs, the costs of Medicare undoubtedly will continue to escalate,
which would be highly problematic for the nation. Current projections
reveal that without some change, Medicare alone will cost the nation
nearly $1 trillion by 2019. 18

15. “[T]he cost of a particular technology is not relevant in the determination of whether the
technology improves health outcomes or should be covered for the Medicare population through an
NCD.” CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR THE
PUBLIC, INDUSTRY AND CMS STAFF: FACTORS CMS CONSIDERS IN OPENING A NATIONAL COVERAGE
DETERMINATION (2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcd/ncpc_view_document.asp?id=6.
See also Ruth Faden & Sean Tunis, Virtual Colonoscopy: A Window Into the Challenges of Health Care
Reform, HEALTH CARE COST MONITOR, Aug. 6, 2009, available at http://healthcarecostmonitor.
thehastingscenter.org/ruthfaden/virtual-colonoscopy-a-window-into-the-challenges-of-healthcarereform/ (“Medicare also addressed the question of whether the higher cost . . . factored into its
decision; it said that the costs were considered but emphasized that its decision was based on uncertainty
about the clinical benefits.”). The cost effectiveness of the colonoscopy at issue in this case was
discussed extensively by people outside of CMS in response to the CMS decision, making CMS’s denial
particularly interesting. One is left wondering whether CMS was ignoring important cost implications
or refusing to admit it had done so.
16. See infra notes 125–127 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Philip R. Alper, Commentary, Kids’ Shoes and Death Panels: Deciding Between
Needs and Wants is Health Care’s Impossible Task, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at B04, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/feb/10/kids-shoes-and-death-panels/ (“It is an open secret,
however, that the more costly the claim, the more intense the scrutiny.”).
18. NHEP, supra note 3, at tbl.3 (predicting $978 billion by 2019).
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The second benefit from directing CMS to openly consider these
types of costs is that, by putting cost-benefit balancing on the table, the
public will have an opportunity to participate in the difficult, cost-driven
decisions CMS already makes sub rosa. 19 There are distinct advantages
to this form of public participation. Without open debate in the face of
the rapid increase of healthcare costs, the United States remains blind as
to what its societal value system requires from difficult cost and access
decisions about health care. 20 To fix this, the nation must clarify the
kinds of medical care that it believes are most fundamentally important.
Yet, before it can do this, the nation needs to put in place effective forms
of democratic deliberation for use in defining the values the nation
wants its healthcare system to reflect. Medicare is uniquely situated as
the place to begin identifying national values regarding the costs of
health care, both because of its sheer size and because its administrator,
CMS, has a platform from which it can generate public discussion about
its proposed rules through its NCD process.
The most significant challenge in directing Medicare explicitly to
consider the costs of particular medical treatment is the fear of revealing
the frightening fact that Medicare is actually rationing health care in
America and that healthcare rationing will only increase in the years
ahead. It may be that politicians’ fears of negative public perception
could lead to limited political support for changing Medicare in the
manner proposed here. On the other hand, experience has shown that
some politicians appear to have benefited from frankly addressing
medical rationing. Putting aside the politics of the matter, it is critically
necessary to control the overall costs of the Medicare program. Without
a more forthright approach to rationing, the healthcare system’s massive
projected cost increases could actually destroy the country’s economy.
Changes in the law that effectively stop this from occurring are clearly
in the public interest.
Part II of this Article describes the CMS process for issuing NCDs
and uses a case study to show how cost concerns affect the NCDs it
issues. This Part describes the history of the Medicare Act, particularly
why costs were not addressed in the language of the Act, and explains
the legal structure of the Medicare Act in the context of this history by
focusing on the language of the Act and how it can be interpreted

19. Public participation takes place during the public comment period in the Medicare coverage
process, described in Part V.B, infra.
20. See Allan S. Brett, “American Values” – A Smoke Screen in the Debate on Health Care
Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 5, 440 (2009) (an excellent discussion on both the constant use of the
concept of “American Values” in healthcare debates and how little we truly know of what these values
are).
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regarding cost.
Part II then examines the evolving process for making NCDs. While
CMS has made a series of failed attempts to explicitly incorporate cost
into this process, more recently it has focused almost entirely on the
quality of evidence it requires from applicants to justify coverage. This
focus, in turn, has created new cost-control problems for CMS. Under
the current scheme, applicants have the financial incentive to design
studies that will receive coverage for the broadest possible population.
Yet, CMS has the financial incentive to interpret the same data so as to
narrow the population for which it approves coverage. CMS’s costdriven interpretations of data to deny coverage are difficult to justify
when the data are of a high quality and clearly support the applicants’
coverage position. Part II concludes with a case study of the NCDs
issued for implantable cardiac defibrillators to illustrate how the
prohibition against considering cost distorts the NCD process.
Part III of the Article considers the relationship between Medicare’s
hidden rationing problem and the recent creation and dissolution of the
Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research
(the Coordinating Council), coupled with substantial funding recently
directed towards cost effectiveness research (CER), arguing that CER is
both vulnerable to being distorted by CMS for cost purposes and that
CER’s potential value to society will be greatly increased by amending
Medicare in the manner this Article suggests. To enable people to
pursue greater value for their healthcare purchases, provisions of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act strengthen the federal
government’s commitment to funding comparative effectiveness
research. The value-enhancing use of this information is left almost
entirely to consumers as the laws governing federal funding of
comparative effectiveness research make it clear that the results of the
research cannot be used by government agencies to create coverage
policies for the purpose of saving money. Part III explains how CER
results are vulnerable to being manipulated for cost-saving purposes.
Given the absence of a formal process for using CER for cost-saving
purposes and how much trust is required for the public to actually adopt
CER findings as guidance for their own medical choices, CER’s success
depends almost entirely on transparently separating its findings from
cost concerns, something that Medicare is currently unable to do while
still protecting its fiscal stability.
Part IV of the Article explores the heart of the political problem—the
explicit rationing of health care—and argues that, counterintuitively,
politicians should be able to survive promoting rationing and that the
nation will benefit, therefrom. The implementation of the Oregon
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rationing structure provides an example of post-rationing political
viability and public approval. Part V offers a proposal for amending the
Medicare Act allowing the cost of new medical treatments to be
addressed openly and directly.
II. THE MEDICARE PROBLEM: HIDING COST IN COVERAGE
CONSIDERATIONS
CMS is the federal agency that administers the Medicare program
(Medicare), which provides health insurance for those over sixty-five
years of age and for the disabled receiving Social Security benefits. It is
responsible for providing healthcare benefits to roughly 45 million
people, the majority of whom are over sixty-five. 21 Medicare spent
$507 billion in 2009, which is 13% of the federal budget for that year. 22
Medicare is an expensive program, and CMS’s relationship with costbased rationing of health care within Medicare is complex. CMS does
not have legislative power to refuse coverage for medical treatments
because of how much they cost, but functions within a budget set by
Congress. Congress, in turn, raises revenue to pay for what Medicare
covers. Raising revenue creates its own set of problems, such as the
political cost of raising taxes. This situation creates an incentive for
CMS to control cost without appearing to violate the law, and provides
Congress with an incentive to loosely examine CMS’s cost-saving
decisions.
CMS has championed efficacy studies and demanded evidence of the
highest probative value to support its coverage decisions. 23 CMS
supports using a “gold standard” 24 of medical evidence. To do this,
CMS ranks the quality of clinical studies based on numerous, coherent,
and sensible criteria that help assess the reliability of the data
generated. 25 For example, studies where doctors do not know which
21. BARBARA S. KLEES ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BRIEF SUMMARIES OF
MEDICARE & MEDICAID 7 (2009), available at http://www.cms.gov/MedicareMedicaidStatSupp/
downloads/2009BriefSummaries.pdf.
22. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: A PRIMER 13 (2009), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7615-02.pdf [hereinafter PRIMER] (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009 MID-SESSION REVIEW: BUDGET OF
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (2008)).
23. See Medicare Program: Criteria for Making Coverage Decisions, 65 Fed. Reg. 31,124 (May
16, 2000).
24. See generally STEFAN TIMMERMANS & MARC BERG, THE GOLD STANDARD: THE
CHALLENGE OF EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AND STANDARDIZATION IN HEALTH CARE (2003).
25. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
MEDICARE COVERAGE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OPERATIONS AND METHODOLOGY SUBCOMMITTEE;
PROCESS FOR EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS AND COMMITTEE OPERATIONS 3–6 (2006), available at

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss1/1

8

Fox: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF COST: MEDICARE DECISIONS, TRANSPARENCY AND PUB
FOX FINAL FORMAT 2

2010]

2/11/2011 3:40:42 PM

THE HIDDEN ROLE OF COST

9

patient is taking a placebo and which is taking a new medicine are
considered more reliable than anecdotal reports of one doctor’s
experience with a patient.
However, when faced with applications for coverage of new and
expensive medical treatments, CMS’s need to control cost makes it
difficult for it to rely entirely on the highest quality data when making
its decisions. Medical costs continue to rise at an astonishing rate 26 with
new treatments driving this increase. 27 CMS must somehow take cost
into account, and when this problem arises, it is actually the high quality
evidence in support of expensive treatments presenting the biggest
problem. Since CMS cannot explicitly consider cost-based criteria when
making coverage decisions, it can only control cost by interpreting data
in a manner that supports a cost-limiting coverage decision. This leads
to CMS making decisions where the role of cost is hidden and its
interpretations of applicants’ data are suspect.
It may appear harsh to claim that CMS’s NCDs are unreliable because
of hidden cost concerns that may influence their ultimate decisions. In
light of CMS’s support of high quality data, particularly in the current,
highly sensitive political environment, such a claim must be made
cautiously. This Article justifies doing so by explaining how the law
and regulations governing Medicare constrain how CMS makes
coverage decisions, supported by concrete, specific examples of how
those constraints have led to this result. This Article does not seek to
portray a government agency that is corrupt or malicious. Rather, CMS
is an agency motivated by stewardship of the Medicare program and
protection of its members. The problem lies in the legal and political
conditions within which CMS must function, and which directly
promote data manipulation. These structures and conditions must
change.
A. A Short History of Medicare and Cost
The United States is far behind most other developed countries in
terms of developing a system of universal health care. 28 In truth, our

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/FACA/Downloads/recommendations.pdf.
26. NHEP, supra note 3, at 1 (indicating that the average rate of healthcare spending is expected
to increase by 6.1% a year into the foreseeable future, while growth in the overall economy is expected
to be 4.4% per year).
27. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., supra note 9.
28. An excellent comparison of different countries’ systems can be found in HEALTH CARE
COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY (Timothy Jost ed., 2004).
See also The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., supra note 9.
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“system” is a series of imperfect safety nets. 29 Medicare, enacted in
1965, was one of the first healthcare safety nets created by the federal
government.
Before the passage of Medicare, people over the age of sixty-five
found it difficult to acquire private health insurance. 30 The poverty rate
for the elderly was quite high, and without insurance, illness was often
financially devastating. 31 Medicare sought to address this problem and
has been very successful in doing so. More than 99% of those over
sixty-five are currently insured in the United States. 32 The poverty rate
for the elderly has been reduced from 35.2 % in 1959 to 10.2% in
2003. 33
While successful in increasing access to health care for the elderly,
Medicare was the result of numerous compromises among the various
interested parties and those compromises resulted in some structural
problems that have contributed to out-of-control spending. 34 The cost of
Medicare now threatens to undermine the increased access that the
original program provided so successfully. The compromises in
Medicare were meant to address stakeholder concerns that: (1)
government, rather than physicians, would control healthcare choices;
(2) hospitals and doctors would be forced to accept low payments due to
government bargaining power; and (3) the elderly would be refused
treatment or provided a lower level of care due to their status as
Medicare beneficiaries. 35 Cost does not appear to have been a pressing
concern, which makes sense when one considers that total national
expenditures for health care, as measured by the federal government in
29. Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. (2006) (providing coverage for those over 65 and
the disabled); Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. (2006) (providing coverage for the poor);
Emergency Medical Treatment & Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006) (requiring
emergency departments to stabilize patients in emergency situations, though the patients bear financial
responsibility for the care provided).
30. PRIMER, supra note 22, at 1 (“Prior to 1965, roughly half of all seniors lacked medical
insurance.”).
31. See Press Release, Patrick Leahy, Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy on the Motion to
Proceed to H.R. 3590, The “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” (November 21, 2009),
available
at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=62ef39d7-76f2-4621-b7b8f1d959433ef3 (stating that more than one in three elderly people lived in poverty prior to the passage of
Medicare).
32. James W. Mold et al., Who Are the Uninsured Elderly in the United States, 52 J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC’Y 601, 601–06 (2004) (publishing the results of a 2000 study which found 350,000
uninsured people over the age of sixty-five).
33. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 2, at 50 tbl.B-2.
34. See Jacqueline Fox, Medicare Should, but Cannot, Consider Cost: Legal Impediments to a
Sound Policy, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 577, 586–96 (2005); see also THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF
MEDICARE (2d ed. 2000).
35. Fox, supra note 34, at 595.
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1965, were $42 billion, compared with expenditures of $2.57 trillion
projected for 2010. 36
In order to satisfy critics and, primarily, to gain the support of the
American Medical Association and similar lobbying groups, Medicare
was designed to encourage providers to treat the elderly to protect both
the pricing structure for the provision of medical care in effect at the
time and the right of physicians to make decisions for their individual
patients. 37 Whatever the merits of these choices, they are now widely
understood to have created a payment system that had an inflationary
impact on the cost of the United States healthcare system. 38
B. How the “Reasonable and Necessary” Language of Medicare
Prevents CMS from Considering Costs
Medicare is administered by CMS, which is an arm of the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS), which itself is an agency in the
executive branch. CMS gets its legal power from the Medicare enabling
act, entitled The Medicare Act, passed by Congress in 1965 and
amended numerous times in subsequent years. 39 The language of the
original Medicare Act specifies Medicare’s scope of coverage: “No
payment may be made under [Medicare] for any expense incurred for
items or services which . . . are not reasonable and necessary for the
diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning
of a malformed body member.” 40 This language has remained
unchanged since 1965 and is the language that dictates how Medicare
evaluates expensive new medical technologies and procedures.
The meaning of Medicare’s “reasonable and necessary” language is
extremely important. Because this language has never been amended, it
is the meaning in 1965 that matters. “Reasonable and necessary” is not
included in any printed official legislative history related to that section
of the Act. The absence of reported debate is not surprising since the
language was inserted in Medicare only as the final work was done

36. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., National Health Expenditures Historical and
Projections
1965–2019,
available
at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/nationalhealthexpenddata/
03_nationalhealthaccountsprojected.asp (follow “NHE Historical and projections, 1965–2019 (ZIP, 32
KB)” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 29, 2010). See also Christopher Chantrill, Total Budgeted
Government Spending Expenditure, http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/year1965_0.html (last
visited Aug. 26, 2009) (showing that the entire federal budget for 1965 was $118 billion and thus
suggesting that the cost of health care was not as worrisome then as it is now).
37. Fox, supra note 34, at 595.
38. Id. at 596–97.
39. Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. (2006).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“Exclusions from coverage”).
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drafting the law for this extensively negotiated program. 41 The language
was taken from a health insurance policy that AETNA offered to federal
government employees at that time. 42 The only change in language
from the AETNA policy was that AETNA refused payment for services
not “reasonable or necessary,” whereas the Medicare program specified
coverage for services that were “reasonable and necessary.” 43
In the 1960s, state courts heard numerous cases requiring judges to
interpret close variants of the statutory language, as it was the typical
language of fee-for-service health insurance contracts at that time. 44
These courts consistently interpreted the health insurance contract
language as giving broad discretion to the recommendation of the
covered person’s treating physician. 45
If the treating physician
determined that a course of treatment was necessary, it appeared to the
courts to be presumptively reasonable that the insurance company
should pay for it. 46 Courts were reluctant to enter into physician’s
decision-making, and they saw nothing in the contracts that allowed
insurance companies to participate in that process either. 47
Soon after passage of the Medicare Act, escalating medical costs
became a national concern. 48 When Medicare was originally written,
these costs were still relatively low, in part due to a limited range of
available medical treatments. As modern science expanded treatment
options, it became clear that medical spending could be theoretically
limitless. 49 In addition, Medicare’s initial reimbursement rates had an
inflationary effect, leading to an explosion of spending for hospital
infrastructures. 50 Medicare’s initial cost projections quickly proved to
be significantly underestimated. In 1965, it projected that the program
would cost $3.1 billion (in 1965 dollars) to administer for 1970. 51 By
1969, that estimate was revised to $5 billion (in 1969 dollars), an
increase of projected cost in raw dollars of more than 60% in four

41. Fox, supra note 34, at 591–93.
42. Id. at 594.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 594–95.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 596.
49. Id.
50. S. REP. NO. 89-404, at 36 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1977. In an
effort to garner political support from hospitals, the Medicare Act included generous hospital
reimbursement rates that were meant to include infrastructure costs.
51. S. REP. NO. 91-1431, at 138 (1970).
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years. 52 This rapid increase in spending for medical care was not
limited to spending on Medicare recipients, and new structures for
providing health insurance in the United States were created in response
to the problem. 53 Some form of managed care gradually became the
norm for most types of medical insurance while Medicare remained
bound to the language of traditional contracts of a different era. 54
In addition to rising costs, a significant part of changing the health
insurance culture apart from Medicare was the enactment of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which became law
in 1974. 55 ERISA is an employee benefit law that regulates employerbased pension and health plans. Most importantly here, ERISA preempts most state lawsuits related to such plans,56 requires benefit law
suits to be brought in federal court, and does not allow any damages to
be awarded to patients beyond the value of the medical care in dispute. 57
Due to ERISA preemption, the majority of health insurance contracts are
administered without fear of significant liability exposure because most
people in this country receive their health insurance through employersponsored ERISA plans. 58 This allows plan administrators to take an
aggressive, cost-saving stance in benefits decisions without the risk of
being held responsible for any damages that a wrongful denial might
cause. The state courts from the 1960s, discussed supra, protected the
right of the doctor to determine what a patient needed, and ERISA has
excluded these courts from most health insurance coverage disputes.
Arguably, ERISA preemption is one of the few significant healthcare
cost-reducing components of our healthcare system. 59
As the health insurance industry broadly adopted concepts from
managed care, insurers changed the language in their contracts to reflect
this, reserving for themselves increasing authority to decide which

52. Id.
53. The federal government enacted the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Act in 1973,
which encouraged the creation of these new forms of health insurance. Health Maintenance
Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e et seq. (2006).
54. Gail A. Jensen et al., The New Dominance of Managed Care: Insurance Trends in the 1990s,
16 HEALTH AFF. 125 (1997).
55. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.
(2006).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
57. § 1001.
58. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER
HEALTH BENEFITS: 2009 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 1 (2009), available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2009/
7937.pdf (reporting that 159 million people are covered by employer-sponsored plans as of 2009).
59. Jacqueline R. Fox, Will Health Care Reform Increase Litigation Over Denied Claims?,
HEALTH CARE COST MONITOR, Oct. 29, 2009, available at http://healthcarecostmonitor.
thehastingscenter.org/jacquelinefox/will-health-care-reform-increase-litigation-over-denied-claims/.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

13

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1
FOX FINAL FORMAT 2

14

2/11/2011 3:40:42 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

expenditures were appropriate for individual patients. 60 Adoption and
exercise of this “gate-keeping” role by the insurance companies
represented a change from the “hands off” approach to doctors’
decisions previously sanctioned by the courts. This change has not been
smooth and the transition from fee-for-service to managed care has been
contentious, but managed care has become ubiquitous outside of
Medicare.
Given the structure of the Medicare Act, where coverage decisions
are still limited to determining what is “reasonable and necessary,” CMS
has not had the power to follow the private sector in changing its
decision-making process to take cost into account. Absent specific
legislative authority to make such resource allocation decisions, the
legality of CMS doing so is questionable. Moreover, without any
statutory changes that explicitly give it this power, CMS has little
political legitimacy to make this type of decision, which is particularly
important since decisions about access to health care have powerful
normative implications. As Jerry Mashaw has addressed in the context
of other administrative actions, the perception of fairness and legitimacy
in a life-altering, decision-making process can be extraordinarily
important to people impacted by the decision. 61
However, even while constrained by its statutory language, it is
impossible for CMS to ignore the cost of new medical treatments. CMS
must protect the fiscal security of the Medicare program. If it fails to do
so, it jeopardizes the provision of health care to its members and risks
angering Congress, who, after all, must raise the money to pay the bulk
of Medicare’s costs. Medicare is already one of the single most
expensive government programs in the federal budget, 62 with costs
projected to rise into the foreseeable future. 63 Medicare’s funding
comes from both payroll taxes and premiums paid by its recipients. 64
These sources of funding are heavily constrained by political pressure on
Congress, this pressure coming from both taxpayers and the elderly. 65 If
CMS were to ignore its decision’s cost implications, Medicare’s massive
cost could become even more problematic.

60. Glen P. Mays et al., Market Watch: Managed Care Rebound? Recent Changes in Health
Plans’ Cost Containment Strategies, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Aug. 2004, available at http://content.
healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w4.427/DC1.
61. Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reason Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 35 (2001).
62. PRIMER, supra note 22, at 1, 13.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 16.
65. See discussion infra Part IV.
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C. National Coverage Determinations
Structurally, Medicare faces two challenges in evaluating expensive
new medical treatments. The first is how to shape NCDs to encourage
or compel Medicare recipients to make the most cost-effective decisions.
The second is how to limit or deny coverage for new technologies or
treatments that are too expensive for the program to support, even if they
are effective. As shown above, it has no power to transparently achieve
either result, which gives it very few avenues for pursuing these goals.
The NCD process affords CMS discretion as it determines which new
medical treatments to cover, and it is within these discretionary acts that
cost concerns have found a home.
1. NCDs and the FDA: How CMS Determines Whether it Should Issue
an NCD, and How This Relates to FDA Approval
New medical technologies face a series of hurdles before being
adopted for use in the United States marketplace. The first hurdle is
approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which medical
device and drug manufacturers must secure in order to get their products
into the marketplace. 66 A second, and equally important, hurdle is
approval by CMS for coverage by the Medicare program. Developers of
medical technology know that, without approval from the CMS, their
products will have no market among the elderly population.
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that private insurers will pay for
coverage without CMS approval. 67
The decision by CMS to consider the issuance of a formal NCD is
primarily based on the potential high cost of a new technology for
Medicare, but it may also be considered if it appears difficult to assess
whether the technology is appropriate for use by Medicare recipients. 68
Potential applicants can also request that CMS consider issuing an NCD
if they believe it will clarify the coverage of a new technology.69 In the
absence of an NCD, local Medicare administrators throughout the
country make coverage decisions by applying the broad standards of the

66. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.1 et seq. (2010) (premarket approval of medical devices).
67. See PAUL N. VAN DE WATER, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, MEDICARE CHANGES
CAN COMPLEMENT HEALTH REFORM (2008), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/7-31-08health.pdf
(discussing the dynamics in the healthcare industry that lead to Medicare having such a dominant role in
coverage decisions).
68. See Medicare Program; Revised Process for Making Medicare National Coverage Decisions,
68 Fed. Reg. 55,634, 55,634-55,641 (Sept. 26, 2003).
69. Id. at 55,638.
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program. 70 These local decisions need not be consistent with each other.
Once an NCD is made, all Medicare coverage must be consistent with
it. 71 It is far more efficient for CMS to undertake NCDs in appropriate
circumstances than for this type of decision to be made countless times
in individual cases.
The current CMS process for approval of new technologies or
treatments requires three steps. First, the care that the technology or
treatment is to provide must fit within a general area that Medicare
covers under the Medicare Act. 72 Second, the specific treatment or
technology must be found to be reasonable and necessary. 73 Third,
Medicare must determine how much it will pay for the proposed
treatment. The Medicare Act requires that this last determination be
kept entirely separate from the first two and made only after they are
completed. 74
Apart from the regulatory process itself, CMS encourages a
collaborative process between persons applying for NCDs and CMS.75
CMS has said that it wishes collaboration to begin long before a formal
application for an NCD is filed, particularly for new technologies that
have not been approved by the FDA for any use whatsoever. An
application for an NCD can be submitted to CMS at the same time as an
application is presented to the FDA for the same device or
pharmaceutical, if the device or pharmaceutical has already received
FDA approval for any other use. 76 However, a formal application for an
NCD is generally not accepted by CMS until a device or pharmaceutical
has received FDA approval for some type of use. 77
For entirely new technologies, the applicant would first apply for an
initial approval from the FDA, wait for the approval, and then apply for
an NCD. 78 To shorten the time involved in this process, as FDA
approval is pending, CMS will collaborate with an applicant on the
design of the studies to be submitted so that the eventual NCD can
proceed quickly after FDA marketing approval is given. 79
FDA approval alone, does not qualify a technology or pharmaceutical
70. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(v)(l) (West 2010).
71. Id.
72. Id.; 68 Fed. Reg. at 55,635.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1) (West 2010).
74. The Secretary of HHS determines payment amounts under § 1395(g)(a) for benefits provided
under Part A of Medicare, and under § 13951(a) for benefits provided under Part B of Medicare.
75. 68 Fed. Reg. at 55,636.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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for NCD approval. CMS has stated that the data sufficient for FDA
approval does not give CMS the type or degree of information it needs
to make the decision required by the “reasonable and necessary”
language. 80 The FDA only decides if a device or pharmaceutical is
“safe and effective,” a phrase with a precise statutory and regulatory
meaning. 81 Simply put, the FDA assesses data about a drug or device to
ensure that it works as claimed and that the health benefits of its use
outweigh the risks. 82 FDA approval is limited in scope: the FDA only
examines the specific use for which the sponsor applies. Because the
basis for FDA approval does not currently involve comparing the drug
or device to any other available treatment, the new drug or device does
not need to function as well or better than other ones and it does not
need to be safer than existing protocols. 83 Furthermore, because of
numerous factors, such as the small number of study participants in FDA
trials, the poor after-approval market analysis of adverse events, and the
wide-spread “off-label” use of what is approved, 84 FDA approval, by
itself, gives limited information about how well a drug or device will
actually function in the Medicare patient population. 85 This approval is
of limited use to CMS in making its own NCD.
2. The Cost Control Potential of NCDs
CMS’s NCDs have implications beyond the health care provided to
Medicare recipients and have the potential to control costs for the entire
United States healthcare system. Once an NCD about a new medical
technology is made, most health insurance companies follow that
decision for their own members, 86 affecting approximately 150 million
people in private plans and another 33.3 million people who are covered
by Medicaid. 87 Consequently, the effect of these coverage decisions and
80. Id.
81. 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(p)(1), (v)(1) (West 2010) (defining “safe & effective”).
82. Id.
83. This, too, may be changing, though it is too soon to know what role the FDA will eventually
have in assessing the comparative quality of new drugs and devices.
84. Off-label usage means that drugs or devices are free to be used by healthcare practitioners
however they see fit once a single reason for use has been approved of by the FDA. When such drugs or
devices are used in any way besides what the FDA has approved, it is referred to as off-label.
85. Bruce Patsner, CMS Review Could Act as a Check on FDA Shortcomings, HEALTH L.
PERSPECTIVES, at 1–3, Sept. 24, 2008, available at http://www.law.uh.edu/Healthlaw/perspectives/2008/
(BP)%20cms2.pdf.
86. JACOB S. HACKER, INST. FOR AM. FUTURE, THE CASE FOR PUBLIC PLAN CHOICE IN
NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM: KEY TO COST CONTROL AND QUALITY COVERAGE 14 (2009), available at
http://institute.ourfuture.org/files/Jacob_Hacker_Public_Plan_Choice.pdf.
87. HOLAHAN & COOK, supra note 13, at 2 fig.1.
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the importance of what CMS considers when making them are
magnified far beyond the number of Medicare recipients.
Consider what happens if this process has to incorporate CMS’s
unspoken concerns about cost. From the perspective of the sophisticated
device manufacturer, the Medicare NCD approval process is clearly
important and any concerns CMS has should be satisfied. The
manufacturer must address and challenge these concerns subtly and
indirectly because there is no step in the process where they can do it
forthrightly. The resulting NCD process risks distorting the scientific
and practical conversations concerning the efficacy and general
usefulness of the new technology that ostensibly occur in a regulatory
environment. As CMS increasingly focuses on the principles of
evidence-based medicine, requiring vigorous proof of efficacy, its
constant concern about cost creates an equally constant risk that the
interpretation of this same evidence will be distorted in order to justify
cost-saving choices. For those generating the data, the risk of distortion,
in turn, creates incentives for them to collect data in a way that is more
resistant to any interpretations influenced by cost that they may face. A
more direct, open, and explicit conversation about the cost of the new
technology would make much more sense from a practical standpoint.
The lack of transparency in the current system undermines the
legitimacy of the public program and creates a ripple effect, distorting
private market decisions.
Furthermore, once coverage has been decided in steps one and two,
reimbursement rates are difficult for Medicare to use as a cost-saving
device. When CMS has agreed to cover a treatment or a technology, the
companies that proposed the technologies or treatments have very little
to lose in battling for generous reimbursement rates. By legally
separating the questions of what a new technology or treatment
accomplishes and what it is worth to Medicare financially, the process
makes bargaining between CMS and the manufacturers extremely
difficult, if not impossible, by removing the coverage decision as
leverage.
It is in the second step of the process, determining what is “reasonable
and necessary,” where centralized gate keeping of expensive medical
technologies, with the concurrent cost saving, occurs for Medicare.
3. Attempts to Define and Expand the Scope of the NCD Process
While managed care spread throughout the private sector, CMS
engaged in a series of unsuccessful attempts to bring concepts from
managed care into its NCD process. CMS published proposed
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regulations in 1989, 1999, and 2000 to incorporate some features of
managed care programs into the Medicare program. 88 Given the limited
scope of the “reasonable and necessary” language, the detailed plans
contained in the proposed regulations likely exceeded CMS’s power to
adopt them. This would have adversely affected their enforceability
under general principles of administrative law. 89 In 2003, CMS took a
different approach and published notices of the procedures it would
follow in making NCDs that did not seek to include a role for cost.
The stated intent of all of the proposed regulations was to define the
criteria to be considered when deciding if a new technology or treatment
was “reasonable and necessary,” and additionally, what would trigger an
NCD process. 90 A variety of ideas were included in the 1989, 1999, and
2000 proposals. In response, CMS received tens of thousands of
negative comments 91 and did not adopt any of the proposals as final
rules. CMS did not provide a reason for those decisions. 92
In the 1989 proposal, CMS suggested using cost effectiveness to
analyze new technology. 93 That suggestion was not adopted as a
specific criterion for NCDs. Cost effectiveness, popularly understood to
mean determining if a new treatment or technology is “as effective as an
alternative but less expensive,” 94 was used in the proposed rule to
describe a process of comparing the benefits and risks offered by a new
technology or treatment against existing ones, while also considering the
comparative financial costs of both. Benefits and risks are construed
narrowly, meaning those that occur to the patient either in the treatment
of a short-term problem or over the course of an illness. 95
88. See Medicare Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical Services Coverage
Decisions That Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed. Reg. 4302, 4302–4318 (Jan. 30, 1989);
Medicare Program; Procedures for Making National Coverage Decisions, 64 Fed. Reg. 22,619 (Apr. 27,
1999); Medicare Program; Criteria for Making Coverage Decisions, 65 Fed. Reg. 31,124 (May 16,
2000).
89. See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006).
90. Medicare Program; Revised Process for Making Medicare National Coverage Decisions, 68
Fed. Reg. 55,634, 55,634 (Sept. 26, 2003).
91. Fox, supra note 34, at 612.
92. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006) (clarifying that when an agency does not adopt a rule, there is no
requirement that a reason be given.).
93. Medicare Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical Services Coverage
Decisions That Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed. Reg. 4302, 4302–4318 (Jan. 30, 1989).
94. Paul E. Kalb, Controlling Health Care Costs by Controlling Technology: A Private
Contractual Approach, 99 YALE L.J. 1109, 1112 (1990).
95. An example of this type of study is the recent work that comparing the use of medicated with
non-medicated coronary artery stents for risks, benefits, cost and outcomes of each. See Patrick W.
Serruys et al., Percutaneous Coronary Intervention versus Coronary-Artery Bypass Grafting for Severe
Coronary Artery Disease, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 961, 961–72 (2009); see also Kathy Hardy,
Angioplasty vs. CABG—A Look at Comparative Effectiveness Research, RADIOLOGY TODAY, June 15,
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The 1999 proposed rule provided for consideration of a cost-benefit
analysis for new technologies or treatments. 96 This type of analysis
requires a society-wide assessment that is broader than the assessment in
a cost-effectiveness analysis and can be a far more problematic
undertaking.
A cost-benefit analysis requires numerous value
judgments; the decision maker must determine the worth of a medical
intervention to society, in part by comparing its benefit to those provided
by other, unrelated expenditures. 97
A relatively simple example of a cost-benefit analysis would be an
examination of whether people over the age of fifty should have organ
transplant surgery. Assuming, for purposes of this example, that organ
transplants can be physically beneficial and life extending for individual
patients, they are arguably cost effective in individual cases. 98 A costbenefit analysis requires additional assessment, particularly in light of
the limited number of organs available for transplant into all potential
patients, many of them far younger and healthier than patients over
fifty. 99 The classic question that arises in this example is whether we
should use a scarce organ for a young person, offering society more
healthy, productive years, or use the organ for an older patient, who has
already given many productive years to the society and so, from that
perspective, might be more deserving.
Contemplation of a refusal of coverage for an individually beneficial
medical procedure represents an extraordinarily challenging decision for
persons in healthcare management. Advising sick people that they
cannot have access to medical care because society does not value their
lives sufficiently to pay for that care creates high emotional and
psychological costs. It certainly raises both moral and normative
issues. 100 This is what is at stake in a cost-benefit analysis of decisions
of resource allocation.
4. Using Evidence of Effectiveness in NCDs
Since 2001, CMS has generally abandoned its effort to explicitly
consider cost when making NCDs. Instead, it has moved toward using
2009, at 10 (article discussing the results of the study).
96. Medicare Program; Procedures for Making National Coverage Decisions, 64 Fed. Reg.
22,619, 22,619–22,625 (Apr. 27, 1999).
97. Id.
98. Fox, supra note 34, at 580–82 (discussing the cost-benefit analysis process in the context of
Heart Transplantation).
99. Id.
100. See generally D.J. Hunter, Rationing Health Care: The Political Perspective, 51 BR. MED.
BULL. 876, 876–84 (1995).
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the concepts of evidence-based medicine and comparative effectiveness
to assess what a new technology or treatment offers Medicare recipients.
In 2003, CMS published a notice of a proposal to revise the process for
making NCDs. 101 The purpose was to “clarify the decision-making
process and increase the opportunity for public participation.” 102
Furthermore, the proposal embodied a new system intended to create a
process that would be as efficient as possible, while ensuring that CMS
had access to all relevant information for making its decisions. 103 The
notice described three types of information to be considered as a basis
for NCDs: descriptive information, scientific evidence, and clinical
evidence. 104
CMS determined that, in order to most efficiently generate data of the
quality it intends to use for NCDs, it needs to work with the scientific
and medical community early in the process of developing a technology
for the marketplace. 105
It did this with Implantable Cardiac
Defibrillators (ICDs), as described in the case study in Part II.D. The
goal to secure the highest quality data also led CMS to seek to clarify the
types of evidence it values, the best practices for study design, and the
manner in which it ranks the quality of evidence supporting the
technology or treatment it is evaluating. 106 CMS plays an active role in
the design of studies and collects data from its recipients regarding
technology or procedures for which it does not yet have adequate
evidence. 107 This active role will likely be enhanced in the future
because CMS appears to have been given a role in allocating federal
funding for comparative effectiveness research. 108 This funding source
is useful because once a new treatment has been approved by CMS, little
incentive remains for a manufacturer to finance further studies.
Oddly, CMS has not explicitly stated an intention to undergo
comparative effectiveness analysis as part of its own NCDs even though
it supports studies that generate the necessary information for doing so.
This intention, however, may be implied from language in the 2003

101. Medicare Program; Revised Process for Making Medicare National Coverage Decisions, 68
Fed. Reg. 55,634, 55,634–55,641 (Sept. 26, 2003).
102. Id. at 55,634.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. MEDICARE COVERAGE ADVISORY COMM. OPERATIONS & METHODOLOGY SUBCOMM., CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. PROCESS FOR EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS AND COMMITTEE
OPERATIONS (2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/FACA/Downloads/recommendations.pdf.
107. Id. at 6.
108. FED. COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RES., DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 4 (2009) [hereinafter CER REPORT].
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notice regarding what type of information CMS considers in making
NCDs. CMS specifically asks for evidence showing the magnitude of
the medical benefit that is, how “coverage of the item or service will
help improve the medical benefit to the target population.” 109 If a
different treatment were already in use with Medicare recipients for the
same diagnosis, the approval of a new treatment, arguably, would only
improve the medical benefit for those recipients if it provided something
better than what was already available.
By focusing on the quality of evidence concerning new technologies
and treatments in making NCDs, CMS enhances the possibility of
providing health care that is most helpful to the target population but
still has done nothing to rein in out-of-control healthcare spending.
CMS puts itself in a position to filter out those expenses for technologies
and treatments that are not useful but does nothing to resolve the
problem of what to do when a technology or treatment is correctly
identified as useful but unreasonable to provide due to cost.
5. How the NCD Process Creates Financial Incentives for Both the
Applicants and CMS to Distort Scientific Data
The way CMS uses scientific data, as clarified in the 2003 notice,
should have a significant impact on the research goals for those who
would seek an NCD approval. First, CMS reserved the right to withhold
approval of a proposed treatment or technology based on inadequate
evidence. “In the absence of adequate evidence, we may conclude that
the item or service is not reasonable and necessary.” 110 Given that most
medical procedures currently in use have little or no evidence to support
their efficacy, such a determination could impose a significantly higher
standard for approval of new technologies or treatments than the
previous standard. This higher standard, in turn, creates genuine
opportunities for CMS to bring about cultural changes regarding
adoption of new medical technologies or treatments. 111 This standard
makes it imperative for companies seeking approval to provide evidence
of efficacy at a level high enough to be considered “adequate” by CMS.
Given the economic importance of a positive NCD to those seeking
CMS approval, the new language clarifies the risk calculus for them.
While testing beyond what the FDA requires for marketing approval
109. Medicare Program; Revised Process for Making Medicare National Coverage Decisions, 68
Fed. Reg. 55,634, 55,637 (Sept. 26, 2003).
110. Id. at 55,636.
111. Peter J. Neumann & Sean R. Tunis, Medicare and Medical Technology – The Growing
Demand for Relevant Outcomes, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 377 (2010).
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may expose weaknesses in safety or efficacy of a technology or
pharmaceutical, failure to perform the testing may preclude CMS
approval altogether. Meaningful comparisons of the efficacy of one
treatment or technology with another are difficult without data that does
just that, derived from studies designed to make such comparisons.
Studies do not routinely compare “apples with apples.” For FDA
approval, a study is far more likely to compare an apple with no apple at
all. The standard tests to show benefit are measured against a baseline
of a placebo, which is the most straightforward method for testing a new
drug. 112 Such studies are not designed to show the comparative value of
the technology or treatment with other technologies or treatments that
are available. If one looks at the risks and costs faced by an applicant,
there is no reason for a manufacturer to sponsor studies that pit its
product against accepted or alternate ones without a specific demand
from CMS for such comparative data. On the other hand, proof of cost
effectiveness or increased efficacy over current treatments would be
highly valuable in addressing cost concerns.
CMS’s desire to use accurate evidence for its NCDs is problematic
because of cost. Evidence could be presented as part of an application
that justifies spending more money than CMS can easily absorb. The
higher the standards of scientific integrity CMS claims to follow, the
more difficult it becomes to justify its interpretations of data that are not
consistent with those standards.
Another problem with the hidden role of cost in this regulatory
scheme is that the FDA and CMS approval criteria create an attractive
opportunity for applicants to maximize profitability at the cost of patient
quality of care. From a profit-maximizing perspective, the ideal study
would present just enough evidence to satisfy both the FDA and
Medicare standards, but nothing more. The applicant would provide
evidence to give proof of efficacy across a broad population, even if the
measure of efficacy was somewhat low, rather than designing a study
that would pinpoint the smaller number of those for whom the device
would be most efficacious. There are no absolute numeric values of
efficacy that automatically count as satisfying the “reasonable and
necessary” standard of the Medicare Act. An applicant can design a
study that is likely to find the amount of effectiveness in a given
population that is required to show a technology is reasonable and
necessary, while keeping the class of possible users as broadly defined
as possible.
This problematic dynamic may well be playing out with some
112. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2010) (describing the acceptable study designs for FDA
submissions).
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regularity in the NCD process. On the surface, CMS values evidence of
a high standard and vigorously promotes its collection. The applicants
listen to and work with CMS, and they move together to engage in an
efficient approval process. Below the surface, the applicants can design
studies calculated to secure approval of the broadest, most profitgenerating scope. CMS can then interpret this data so that it appears to
justify artificially narrowing its approval, thus saving money. This
Article hypothesizes that this is exactly how the process occurs. CMS
has developed a way of controlling some aspects of the cost problem,
with the most difficult decisions and negotiations being made almost
entirely below the surface.
6. Coverage with Limitations: The Current Compromise Between Cost
and Evidence
Rather than outright denying applications for NCDs, CMS has a
pattern of approving coverage with limitations. Doing this allows CMS
to consider the evidence, decide that a new treatment is both reasonable
and necessary, and limit the cost of the treatment to the program by
giving it to fewer patients than the applicant had hoped. A recent study
examined sixty-nine CMS NCDs issued between 1999 and 2003 to
assess if CMS decisions were consistent with the quality of the evidence
then available. 113 This study concluded that most CMS decisions to
cover a technology or treatment were consistent with the quality of the
evidence. 114 The more troubling finding (though not noted as such by
the authors) was that 61% of all CMS decisions that agreed to cover the
technologies or treatments were limited in scope. These NCDs provided
coverage with substantial conditions or limiting factors. 115 Even though
the study found that the broad decision, whether or not to cover at all,
was consistent with the evidence before CMS, it did not examine
whether the conditions or limitations were consistent with the evidence.
Given the extraordinary cost of new medical treatments, is it
implausible that 61% of all NCDs over a four-year span were limited in
scope to save money? It is a significant possibility that this occurs, and
evidence of this is presented in the case study discussed in Part II.D. By
refraining from denying coverage outright and by remaining flexible in
the face of new data, Medicare manages to stave off political problems
likely created by an outright denial. To accomplish all of this, CMS
113. Peter J. Neumann et al., Medicare’s National Coverage Decisions, 1999–2003: Quality of
Evidence and Review Times, 24 HEALTH AFF. 243, 243–54 (2005).
114. Id. at 243.
115. Id. at 246, 252–53.
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must behave in a manner that is not transparent, that contravenes its
enabling act, and that perpetuates a system distorting the healthcare
system by generating suspect NCDs. Given the pressure on CMS to
manage cost in this hidden manner, the Medicare Act should be
amended to require explicit consideration of cost in making NCDs so
that this is no longer even a theoretical risk.
D. A Case Study: High Quality Evidence and Implantable Cardiac
Defibrillators
CMS coverage of the Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators (ICD) is a
case study that gives concrete examples of how the incentives described
supra for both CMS and applicants distort the NCD process. It also
shows how the current NCD process cannot be used to adequately
address the problem of extraordinarily expensive new medical
treatments.
An ICD is a small electronic device implanted in a person’s body and
designed to restart the heart if it fails, much as an external defibrillator
does. 116 Simply put, the benefits of the implantable device over the
external machine are that it: (1) provides constant monitoring; (2) does
not require trained personnel to be operated; and (3) fires immediately
when there is a problem, thereby protecting the user from damage
caused by any delay in restarting his or her heart. The device became
well known when former Vice President Cheney had one implanted
during his first term in office. 117
Initially, CMS approved coverage of ICDs for people who had
already suffered a “sudden death” cardiac episode and had been
successfully resuscitated. 118 While purchasing and implanting the
device was expensive, the covered population was small and the total
cost to the Medicare program by 2001 was $1 billion a year, roughly 1%
116. MOSBY’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2009) (“[I]mplantable cardioverter-defibrillator
(ICD), a surgically implanted electric device that automatically terminates lethal ventricular arrhythmias
by delivering low-energy shocks to the heart, restoring proper rhythm when the heart begins beating
rapidly or erratically. About the size of an audiotape cassette, the device can be implanted without
thoracotomy in many cases. It is attached to the abdomen or chest wall with a wire link to the heart.”).
117. Abigail Trafford, Second Opinion: Implantable Defibrillators, WASH. POST, July 31, 2001,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/liveonline/01/health/health0731.htm.
118. This was an accepted treatment for these patients, particularly after 1997, when the New
England Journal of Medicine published a study showing that ICDs worked better than the drugs
available at that time. See AVID Clinical Trial Ctr., A Comparison of Antiarrhythmic-Drug Therapy
with Implantable Defibrillators in Patients Resuscitated from Near-Fatal Ventricular Arrhythmias: The
Antiarrhythmics Versus Implantable Defibrillators (AVID) Investigators, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1576,
1576–83 (1997) (a comparison of antiarrhythmic drug therapy with implantable defibrillators in patients
resuscitated from near-fatal ventricular arrhythmias).
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of the Medicare annual budget at that time. 119
By November 2001, CMS was aware that studies sponsored by
manufacturers of ICDs were showing that a far broader patient
population could benefit from implanting the device and that it would be
extremely expensive for Medicare to provide it to such a population.
These new potential patients were people who suffered from heart
problems but who had not yet suffered a sudden death cardiac episode.
The MADIT II trial was a large-scale, multi-hospital study of ICDs
sponsored by Guidant, an ICD manufacturer, which included this
expanded class of potential patients. 120 It was halted in November 2001
because the data safety monitoring board that oversaw the trial found a
large positive effect of the ICD. This made it potentially unethical not to
offer the device to all of the people enrolled in both arms of the trial,
including those receiving the ICD and those receiving only medications.
The positive results of the MADIT II trial were published in the New
England Journal of Medicine on March 11, 2002. 121 On July 18, 2002,
the FDA expanded its approval of the Guidant ICD so that it covered the
types of patients identified in the MADIT II study.
By mid-2003, CMS had not expanded its coverage of ICDs to cover
patients fitting within the MADIT II criteria.
This generated
controversy, especially in light of the overall positive reception the trial
results had received. 122 Following on the heels of the rapid FDA
approval action in July 2002, the American Heart Association consensus
guidelines that guide cardiology practice recommended that cardiac
surgeons follow the MADIT II criteria when assessing who should have
an ICD implanted. 123 In February 2003, the Medicare Coverage
Advisory Committee that convened to assist CMS in making the ICDcoverage decision voted unanimously in favor of coverage for the

119. Stephen C. Hammill, Influence of the Medicare Reimbursement System on ICD Implantation,
5 CARDIAC ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY REV. 133, 135 (2001).
120. Medscape CRM, Medicare Panel Recommends Expanded Coverage for ICDs, MEDSCAPE
TODAY, Mar. 21, 2003, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/451046 (explaining in detail the structure
of the Second Multicenter Automated Defibrillator Implantation Trial).
121. Arthur J. Moss et al., Prophylactic Implantation on a Defibrillator in Patients with
Myocardial Infarction and Reduced Ejection Fraction, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 877, 877, 882 (2002) (for
the Multicenter Automatic Defibrillator Implantation Trial II Investigators).
122. Medscape CRM, CMS Draws Heat as Coverage of MADIT II ICD Decision Draws Near,
MEDSCAPE TODAY, May 23, 2003, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/456391 [hereinafter
Medscape Heat].
123. The full title of the guidelines is the American Heart Association/American College of
Cardiology/North American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology (AHA/ACC/NASPE) Consensus
Guidelines. See Matthew R. Reynolds & Mark E. Josephson, MADIT II (Second Multicenter Automated
Defibrillator Implantation Trial) Debate: Risk Stratification, Costs, and Public Policy, 108 AM.
HEALTH ASS’N 1779, 1780 (2003).
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MADIT II criteria. 124
On May 15, 2003, Sean Tunis, CMS’s medical director at that time,
spoke at a public meeting on the subject of CMS’s delay in approval for
expanded ICD coverage. 125 While he listed some scientific concerns
regarding coverage, he clearly stated that the overwhelming problem
was “about the money,” and that CMS had to “draw a line in the sand”
because there is “no wiggle room in the Medicare budget.” 126 In a
forthright explanation of the problems Medicare faced with new and
expensive medical treatments, he said:
As money goes to higher tech services and newer benefits, we are led
in [the] direction of under compensating for primary care, home health
care, [and] skilled nursing care. Medicare must avoid this tendency so
that these worthwhile services don’t get starved as more and more
resources are applied to newer, high tech services, especially those that
are very expensive and have [only] modest benefits. 127

Clearly the main point of this speech was that CMS must control the
costs of new and expensive medical treatments so that other Medicare
programs do not suffer underfunding. When examined in light of
Medicare’s legal structure, it is unclear what power CMS has to
legitimately address any of these concerns. The ICD presented
sufficient financial risk to Medicare to make line drawing necessary, if
at all possible for it to accomplish. The cost implications of the MADIT
II trial were astonishing. 128 If all existing patients with the implicated
heart conditions had use for an ICD, it could include an estimated 3 to 5
million patients. 129 Many of these patients were Medicare recipients,
and, in addition to the initial cost, an estimated 300,000 additional
Medicare patients would require the ICD each year. 130 At a cost of
$30,000 a patient for the surgery and device, the initial outlay could
124. Id. at 1779.
125. Medscape Heat, supra note 122.
126. Id.
127. Id. (“At a free-wheeling CMS issues session at the North American Society of Pacing and
Electrophysiology (NASPE) 24th Annual Scientific Sessions, Tunis bluntly told attendees that ‘it is
about the money.’ There is no wiggle room in the Medicare budget, he said, so CMS has drawn a clear
line in the sand.”).
128. Helen S. Barold, Using the MADIT II Criteria for Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators—
What is the Role of the Food and Drug Administration Approval?, 7 CARDIO ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY
REV. 443, 446 (2004) (“The results of the MADIT II study have generated a great deal of controversy in
the world of electrophysiology. Much of the controversy appears related to the sheer numbers of
potential Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator (ICD) implants and their potential cost to the healthcare
system.”).
129. Medscape Heat, supra note 122 (including those with serious coronary heart disease and
advanced left ventricular dysfunction).
130. Id. (explaining the structure of this study in some detail).
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have been as much as $150 billion, more than the entire 2002 Medicare
budget, as well as future annual costs of $8 billion a year, 8% of
Medicare’s annual budget. 131
Even as CMS expressed concern about cost and delayed issuing an
NCD, it was in an awkward position regarding any criticism it could
make about the MADIT II trial. CMS had already made clear that it
valued evidence of a high caliber and that it preferred to work with
potential applicants early in the process, so that it could help ensure that
the studies submitted to it were well designed. Consistent with this
commitment, CMS and the FDA advised Guidant on how to collect data
on safety and efficacy during the MADIT II trial that would serve to
satisfy CMS’s and the FDA’s different approval requirements. 132 Given
CMS’s early role in the study and the otherwise positive reception for its
results, CMS’s challenges to the quality of the data were going to be
difficult to justify.
From CMS’s perspective, one could argue that the overwhelming
flaw in the study was that it failed to identify who was most likely to
truly benefit from the ICD. The study showed solid evidence of benefit
in a small percentage of a broad population when all of the population
used the device, but did not give enough information to assess which
specific people needed it. 133 Put another way, the data as presented by
Guidant showed that a small percentage of a large population would get
a positive benefit from having these devices. 134 The data did not give a
clear picture of how to identify, in advance, which patients would
benefit. If CMS could accurately identify these people, it would save
money as well as prevent unnecessary and risky medical procedures for
its recipients. Furthermore, the question of how coverage could be
structured had been left open until more information had been collected
to assist CMS in narrowing the target population. MADIT II did not, by
itself, answer this query because it provided insufficient data about
subgroups within its subjects. 135
While it would be unfair to expect a single study to answer all
questions one could have, the contemporaneous criticisms of Guidant’s
study appear to substantiate a claim that it was meant to give little
information to guide those making stratification decisions. The clear
131. Id.
132. Moss et al., supra note 121.
133. Medscape Heat, supra note 122.
134. Reynolds & Josephson, supra note 123, at 1781.
135. Id. (“From the outset, there has been concern that compared with current risk-stratification
strategies, less selective criteria for ICD implantation could result in many patients receiving ICDs who
do not stand to benefit from them, exposing some patients to unnecessary risks and using societal
resources less efficiently.”).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss1/1

28

Fox: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF COST: MEDICARE DECISIONS, TRANSPARENCY AND PUB
FOX FINAL FORMAT 2

2010]

2/11/2011 3:40:42 PM

THE HIDDEN ROLE OF COST

29

financial incentive for applicants in the NCD process is to show enough
benefit to have coverage be “reasonable and necessary” in the broadest
possible group of people. Guidant succeeded in this to such an
extraordinary degree with MADIT II as to push CMS into a financial
corner.
As an example of study design choices that are consistent with the
incentives described here, MADIT II enrolled people with both
inducible and noninducible ventricular arrhythmias, but did not test them
or sort them into different groups because of this difference. Prior
studies had shown that ICDs were effective for people with inducible
arrhythmias, but, by lumping both types of patients together, the study
did not give clear answers as to ICD usefulness in those with
noninducible arrhythmias. 136 This data was also never collected for the
control group of the study, that is, the people who did not receive the
ICD. 137 CMS wanted this data to help shape its NCD and so both
Guidant and CMS tried to interpret the MADIT II data for this
purpose. 138 It is difficult to analyze data after a study has been
completed and these post hoc studies are not as statistically relevant as
the results of the study itself. 139 The two post hoc analyses reached
different conclusions, and neither was as valid as other forms of
statistical data could be. 140
CMS issued its NCD for ICDs on June 6, 2003. It expanded the
scope of coverage from what it had covered before, but coverage was
substantially narrower than the MADIT II criteria. It did not follow its
own advisory board recommendation or the FDA marketing approval.
Instead, it conducted a post hoc analysis of the MADIT II data and
created a stratification strategy that sharply limited the number of
potential patients who would qualify for ICDs. The validity of this post
hoc analysis was strongly criticized when the NCD was issued. A
typical criticism of the coverage policy claimed that it was dependant on
CMS’s “controversial interpretation [of the MADIT II data] that was
widely viewed by the medical community as an arbitrary attempt to
reduce the coverage population.” 141 Although cost was a problem
136. Id. at 1779–80.
137. Id. at 1780.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (“That these analyses even became necessary in our opinion simply illustrates that the
most crucial clinical question to arise from MADIT II (is EP testing necessary?) was inadequately
addressed by the design of the study. In retrospect, a study enrolling only noninducible patients might
have generated less controversy.”).
141. Michael O. Sweeny et al., Rules of Evidence: CMS and the Primary Prevention of Sudden
Cardiac Death in Systolic Heart Failure, 28 PACE 81, 83 (2005).
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openly discussed by Medicare officials, “the internal technology
assessment conducted by CMS on MADIT II specifically excluded cost
effectiveness studies.” 142 This CMS claim, that cost played no factor in
its decision, was not credible. 143
Is it necessary, in light of this history of how the ICD-NCD process
occurred, for CMS to change? CMS saved money, protecting Medicare
from financial ruin. It has been flexible in its coverage of ICDs since
2003, issuing new, modified NCDs as better data about ideal patient
populations has been collected. 144 Patients have access to ICDs, and the
United States is doing well in providing access compared to other
countries. 145 As described above, the problem is with the process CMS
used. The purpose of this case study is to show how the cost of new
medical treatments can influence CMS’s coverage decisions and the
harm that results. There was no transparent, public debate about how
much money should be spent on ICDs, nor was there an open discussion
about the quality of evidence that should be required before expanding
the use of this treatment or to justify paying for it. Instead, the existence
of questions about the quality of the evidence was used as an
opportunity to justify cost savings for Medicare.
III. COMPARATIVE-EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH
A discussion about cost and Medicare would be incomplete without
some consideration of Comparative Effectiveness Research (CER).
CER has been promoted as a way to control the cost of the healthcare
system, particularly Medicare, 146 but in truth it is not likely to control
cost unless it is coupled with some form of programmatic rationing. On
its own, CER can be directly used to guide patient decision-making,
without regard for cost. Coupled with policy decisions regarding
142. Reynolds & Josephson, supra note 123, at 1783 (referencing Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, Decision Memorandum: Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators, # 00157N (2003)).
143. Id. at 1781 (“The result is awkward, with CMS publicly pretending that their decisions are
not driven in part by financial motives, and nobody really believing them.”).
144. Sweeny et al., supra note 141, at 81 (discussing CMS’s continuing efforts to correctly
identify appropriate ICD recipients).
145. Christopher S. Simpson, Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators Work—So Why Aren’t We
Using Them?, 177 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 49, 49 (2007) (discussing utilization).
146. See, e.g., Robert, Steinbrook, Health Care and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,
360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1057, 1057 (2009) (“[C]omparative effectiveness studies that directly compare
the risks and benefits of different treatments for a particular condition are essential for improving
practice and slowing cost escalation.”); THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXPLAINING HEALTH
REFORM: WHAT IS COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH? 1 (2009), available at
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7946.pdf (“Identifying the most effective and efficient
interventions has the potential to reduce unnecessary treatments, which in turn, may help lower costs.”).
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rationing, CER can be used to guide resource allocations, thus allowing
finite resources to be spent in a manner that secures the best outcomes
for patients in the aggregate. Given the current problems with hidden
rationing in Medicare, CER results are at risk of being distorted relied
upon as scientific support for what are, in truth, political and societal
decisions about healthcare rationing. 147
Additionally, the usefulness of CER is significantly compromised due
to persistent public distrust of its ultimate goals. 148 Currently, the public
does not trust healthcare research about effectiveness generated by both
private enterprise and the government. 149 There is no clear reason for
this public distrust except, perhaps, due to the fear that the research will
be used to justify rationing without any public debate. 150 CER is not the
same as the rationing decisions that may be made in its name, but this
fact is poorly understood. If future CER findings are manipulated by
CMS, this will only serve to confirm people’s fears and undermine the
ability of CER to improve the quality of the healthcare system.
Important for this discussion is the increase in federal funding for
CER, and the structure for conducting it. The Federal Coordinating
147. For an excellent discussion of this vulnerability in the context of politics, the healthcare
industry and CER, see Susan Bartlett Foote, How Comparative Effectiveness Can Save Money, HEALTH
CARE
COST
MONITOR,
July
7,
2009,
available
at
http://healthcarecostmonitor.
thehastingscenter.org/suasanbartlettfoote/how-comparative-effectiveness-research-can-save-money/
(“Comparative effectiveness will not save money unless supporters of value-based care stand up and
say—let’s not just gather evidence, let’s be sure we do not pay for care that is inconsistent with it.”).
148. Consider, for example, the November 2009 recommendations about the frequency of
mammograms by the United States Preventive Services Task Force and the public response. These
recommendations called for mammograms to start at a later age and take place less frequently than had
been called for by its previous recommendation from 2002. The new recommendations unleashed a
public controversy, with the Secretary of Health and Human Services finally assuring voters that the
federal government policies about mammograms would not change as a result of these
recommendations. See Editorial, Sebelius: Mammogram Policies Unchanged, UPI.COM, Nov. 18,
2009, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2009/11/18/Sebelius-Mammogram-policies-unchanged/UPI18271258591793/ (notably failing to address whether the panel recommendations were actually correct
or appropriate); see also Roni Caryn Rabin, Doctor-Patient Divide on Mammograms, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
10, 2010, at D7. According to an editorial in the Annals of Internal Medicine from February 2010,
doctors are more inclined to accept the new recommendations, implying, arguably, that there is at least
some scientific merit to the new recommendations. Editorial, When Evidence Collides with Anecdote,
Politics, and Emotion: Breast Cancer Screening, 152 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 531 (2010).
149. NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO ET AL., THE PUBLIC AND THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2
(2009), http://www.npr.org/documents/2009/apr/nprpoll_charts.pdf (reporting poll results showing 72%
of Americans think there is insufficient scientific research to show what will work best for patients, and
only 55% would trust an independent panel of experts to help make these determinations, with the
percentage trusting this panel dropping to 41% if the federal government plays a role in appointing these
experts and, even in the face of evidence that a treatment is not as effective as another, 56% think
private insurers should be compelled to pay for the less effective treatment).
150. Rush Limbaugh, Transcript, The March to Socialized Medicine Starts in Obama’s Porkulus
Bill, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_020909/content/01125111.guest.html
(consistently expressing the idea that the purpose of CER is to ration health care).
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Council for CER (the Council) was created by federal law in 2009. The
Council was terminated under the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010, 151 replaced by the Patient Centered Outcomes
Research Trust Fund 152 for the support of the Patient Centered
Outcomes Research Institute (the Institute). The goals of this Institute
appear to be the same as the earlier Council, though the new legislation
is far less detailed than the original. The Council appears to have been
“the source for the ‘death panel’ uproar,” 153 which perhaps led to its
demise and reconfiguration. The original law creating the Council was
explicit with regard to excluding cost from the recommendations the
Council could issue based on CER studies as well as severely limiting
the force these recommendations could carry. While prohibiting
discussion of cost, which one might assume will carry over to the newly
formed Institute, may serve to protect CER from political turmoil, it also
severely limits CER’s ability to reduce the cost of the healthcare system.
Part III.B describes the problems of, and limitations with, CER. Finally,
Part III.C describes the sources for the high level of public distrust of
CER that has become evident since this new language was passed.
A. Federal Law and CER Funding
In February 2009, $1.1 billion in funding for CER was included in the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). 154 ARRA
also included legislation creating the Federal Coordinating Council for
CER (the Coordinating Council), which was meant to oversee the
distribution of much of the funding. 155 The proposal to fund CER met
some resistance, which continued throughout the debate over the
healthcare reform, resulting in the Council being terminated in the new
Act and replaced by the Institute. The publically stated concern
expressed by some commentators is that CER is a code word for
rationing health care, and that the federal government will use CER to
dictate the medical care to which people have access. 156 The language
151. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6302, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
152. § 6301(e)(1), (e)(2), (f).
153. See 1 CCH, CCH’S LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 850 (2010).
154. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115. See
also CER REPORT, supra note 108, at 11.
155. 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-8 (West 2010).
156. See Colin Hanna, Rationing Wolves in Public Servants’ Clothing, ROLL CALL, July 6, 2009,
available at http://www.rollcall.com/news/36488-1.html; see also Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration
Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2009, at MM38, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/
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of ARRA, as well as subsequent communications from the Coordinating
Council, does not substantiate these claims and, in fact, goes to great
pains to defuse this type of concern. 157 The Coordinating Council
released a report on June 30, 2009, explaining that “[t]he purpose of
[CER] is to provide information that helps clinicians and patients choose
which option best fits an individual patient’s needs and preferences.”158
This information is necessary, the Coordinating Council said, due to
“astonishing achievements in biomedical science,” leading doctors and
patients to a “plethora of choices” when it is often “unclear which
therapeutic choices work best for whom, when and in what
circumstances.” 159
While the results of CER can be used to justify cost-based decisions,
there is nothing in CER itself that directly leads to rationing. Certainly
benefits and problems have the potential to arise through the
interpretation and use of CER. Perhaps CER and its uses have been
conflated in the public’s eye, or, of more interest here, perhaps prior use
of CER by private and public sector healthcare payers to justify
decisions that are motivated by unspoken cost concerns has poisoned the
public trust.
Whatever its source, public worry about CER has been expressed in
graphic terms. One of the more colorful was the accusation that funding
for CER was part of a government goal to create “death panels,” where
elderly patients would have to appear individually and where a
government committee would then vote on their right to continued
treatment. 160 There have also been accusations that the Coordinating
Council would use newly compelled electronic medical records to track
the individual care decisions made by doctors in the country, with power
to override any single treatment decision and many other similar
claims. 161 No language in ARRA supports any of these claims. In fact,
magazine/19healthcare-t.html?_r=2.
157. CER REPORT, supra note 108, at 16 (CER has been defined by the Coordinating Council as
“the conduct and synthesis of research comparing the benefits and harms of different interventions and
strategies to prevent, diagnose, treat and monitor health conditions in ‘real world’ settings. The purpose
of this research is to improve health outcomes by developing and disseminating evidence-based
information to patients, clinicians, and other decision-makers, responding to their expressed needs, about
which interventions are most effective for which patients under specific circumstances.”).
158. Id. at 3 (containing part of a longer definition of the purpose of the Council’s work).
159. Id.
160. Limbaugh, supra note 150 (quoting Betsy McCaughey, former Lt. Governor of N.Y.).
161. Id. See also Kurt Nimmo, Barney Frank, Eugenics Death Panels, and a Dining Room Table,
FREE REPUBLIC, Aug. 19, 2009, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2320327/posts (The Council’s
“purpose is to empower an unelected bureaucracy to make decisions about healthcare rationing that
elected politicians are politically unable to make.”); Rich Lowery & Robert Costa, The Rogue, on the
Record, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Nov. 17, 2009, http://article.nationalreview.com/414954/the-rogue-on-the-
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the Coordinating Council went to excessive lengths to make clear that its
purpose is to enhance the quality of information that a doctor and patient
consider when making individual, patient care decisions. 162 Yet, as of
September 2009, 41% of Americans believed that healthcare reform
included a panel that would prevent the elderly from obtaining necessary
medical care, as described by critics of CER and the Coordinating
Council. 163
CER is especially important because the healthcare system does not
currently include any centralized resource allocation system. While
there are benefits to allowing autonomous decisions regarding individual
healthcare choices, the responsibility for demanding value, minimizing
waste, and being responsible about resource uses now rests heavily upon
individual patients, the medical establishment, and insurance companies.
The information presented by high quality CER is a resource that can
guide these individual decisions if the conclusions are trusted. As
described below, this trust is not currently assured, and failure to change
the system to allow it to flourish may cripple many of the goals of
healthcare reform. Medicare, as currently constructed, is a part of this
problem, but it can readily become part of its resolution.
B. Problems with CER
CER can be useful, but it is extremely complex and potentially
problematic to implement recommendations based on its results. CER’s
usefulness depends on a fairly sophisticated level of understanding
regarding the meaning of its results and how to use that information. It
may be that this complexity is what raises such significant public
concerns. If so, it is essential to have trusted resources for both
record/rich-lowry-and-robert-costa?page=3 (Sarah Palin describing why she referred to the Council as a
“death panel”: “While reading that section of the bill, it became so evident that there would be a panel of
bureaucrats who would decide on levels of health care, decide on those who are worthy or not worthy of
receiving some government-controlled coverage,” which would, in turn “lead to harm.”).
162. CER REPORT, supra note 108, at 59. In its response to the negative public outcries, an
interesting notation appears in the minutes of the Coordinating Council’s second meeting: “Council
members also noted that they had heard, loud and clear, that the Council’s governance and processes
must be transparent, and that the Council must incorporate input from all stakeholders to gain credibility
and build trust.” Id. This comment makes it clear that trust and credibility are problems here.
163. Opinion Res. Corp., CNN Opinion Research Poll, at 7, Sept. 13, 2009, available at
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2009/images/09/14/rel14b2.pdf. Typical of the incoherency within this
debate, the argument has been that the Council, as created in February 2009, would lead to death panels
whereas the Poll, given in September 2009, was asking about people’s concerns with proposals for
future healthcare reform, specifically: “If Obama’s plan became law, do you think senior citizens or
seriously-ill patients would die because government panels would prevent them from getting the medical
treatment they needed?” Id. One could argue, then, that it is unclear what, exactly, these fears are even
peripherally related to.
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communicating and educating. For a sick person, the availability of
reliable and unbiased information comparing the available treatments is
useful, and, so, from that perspective, it seems strange that the collection
of such information would become a lightning rod for political debate.
As one conservative commentator put it, “CER is obviously a valuable
and time-honored endeavor, and for anyone (conservatives or anyone
else) to come out against it would be akin to coming out against babies,
or bunnies.” 164
An example of CER’s usefulness is a study from 2009 that offered
guidance to patients making decisions about heart surgery. This study
compared two treatments available for people with serious heart disease:
an invasive type of heart surgery as compared to a less invasive
implantation of cardiac stents. 165 Comparing the two procedures across
a large population of patients, it appeared that if a patient had a stent
implanted, she would have a greater risk of needing further surgery. 166
If, on the other hand, the patient had the more invasive heart surgery, she
would have a greater risk of suffering serious strokes. 167 Closer analysis
of the data implied that if a patient had a more serious form of heart
disease, she might not benefit from the stents as much as she would from
the surgical procedure. 168 Such information did not present an easy or
obvious choice for patients and necessarily required close
communication with the treating physician to ascertain the best
approach. 169 The CER, however, did add significant information to the
decision-making process.
There are limitations to what a healthcare study can be expected to
accomplish. Statistics about the efficacy of medical care provide
percentages of success, failure, and the risk of side effects in the study
population. Because efficacy is rarely proven in 100% of cases, patients
who go forward with medical treatment do so with foreknowledge of
some risk. The statistics show that the healthcare system consistently
both under- and over-treat. A certain number of patients will be given a
164. Posting of DrRich to Better Health, http://www.getbetterhealth.com/who’s-againstcomparative-effectiveness-research/2009.05.15 (May 15, 2009).
165. See Patrick W. Serruys et al., Percutaneous Coronary Intervention versus Coronary-Artery
Bypass Grafting for Severe Coronary Artery Disease, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 961, 961–72 (2009).
166. Id. (specifically, an increased risk of needing “revascularization”).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Roni Caryn Rabin, Heart Stents Found as Effective as Bypass for Many Patients, N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
19,
2009,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/health/
20heart.html?_r=1&ref=health (“‘What they’re telling us is that these procedures are similar in many
respects,’ he added. ‘For individual patients, one is often better than the other. For a patient who can
have either one, there are pluses or minuses to each one.’” (quoting Dr. L. David Hillis, Chairman of the
Dep’t of Med. at the Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. in San Antonio)).
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treatment and not benefit and a certain number of patients will suffer
side effects. Some unfortunate patients will not have positive effects
and will suffer side effects. When research predicts a percentage of
“winners” from an intervention, it is known that the balance of that
100% will be “losers” of some sort.
For an example of winners and losers, consider a hypothetical—a
simple study of effectiveness for a new antibiotic. If the new antibiotic
A is 80% effective in a sample population for curing a specific bacterial
infection Z, then if the same ratio holds true for the general population
outside of the study, 20% of the people given the antibiotic will not
benefit from it. Since all medical treatment has some risk of a negative
side effect or allergy, that 20% will be exposed to this risk of harm
without receiving any benefits.
A comparison of the effectiveness of two antibiotics, as is performed
in CER, becomes more complex. If research shows that Antibiotic B is
effective in 20% of a similar sample population for a similar problem as
in the original study about A, new problems emerge. A simple response
to this comparison would be to use A and not use B, since B’s efficacy is
much lower than A’s. But what if some of the 20% for whom B works
are the same people who do not receive a benefit from A? Presuming
CER has not generated a method for absolutely identifying which group
a patient belongs in, the risk of using the wrong antibiotic remains.
From a societal perspective, CER presents a different problem.
Because of the research, it is known that a predictable amount of waste
and some unnecessary exposure to the risks of negative effects will
occur when using either antibiotic. Across a population, an antibiotic
that has an 80% success rate is clearly better than one with a 20%
success rate. Putting that conclusion into a specific policy and choosing
A over B, deprives 20% of the population of a treatment that might work
for them. A policy could also be implemented that would provide both
A and B, letting patients decide, but that risks curing far fewer people if
many choose what is known, statistically, to be the wrong choice for the
population as a whole. Using a broad protocol for all patients based on
CER, entrenches the numbers of losers and winners. Failure to continue
research in an area after adopting a protocol risks stifling research into
new protocols that could improve outcomes. Such a result would not be
risked in the absence of a CER-supported protocol. The challenge with
the information available from CER is to resist over-simplifying, that is,
reaching for an easy decision about medical treatments when the data
alone does not justify that response.
The political implications become greater when one adds a cost
component to this discussion. Add to the complexity of the decision
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about antibiotics A and B the fact that B costs ten, or even one hundred
times, more than A. Again, the instinct is to choose A, but the same
problems remain. The cost difference could make a difference in how
society views B, since it has both a low efficacy across the population
and a high overall cost, but it does not change what happens to the 20%
for whom B would work. This is the point where hidden-cost concerns
can be most damaging to the usefulness of CER. The temptation to
maximize the dollar value of interventions, while at the same time
avoiding the appearance of making difficult allocation decisions, could
prevent the system from further probing the potential usefulness of B.
This can be accomplished by saying that B is simply not good enough
because it only works in 20% of the patients. While reliable information
can be generated by CER, it can then be used to make rigid decisions
based on both CER and cost, without a public airing of how cost
considerations are taken into account. This appears to be the fear behind
the criticisms of CER and is a problem likely to arise in Medicare.
C. Why the Public Mistrusts Data
The difficulties with CER as described above, while challenging, are
likely only one reason for the public debate. Those who control data can
easily manipulate it, as the public has seen in various contexts in recent
years. It would be sensible for this to lead to suspicions about study
results. The subtle distortion of data that occurs in the CMS approval
process is not likely to be widely understood, and it is hardly fair to
place the blame on CMS for the strong opposition to CER.
A significant reason for the public’s mistrust lies with the
pharmaceutical industry. Research into the efficacy of drugs and
medical devices is widely considered unreliable and riddled with
scandal, and, as a result, people do not trust pharmaceutical companies
or those who regulate them. 170 Proof of “safety and efficacy,” as
certified by the FDA, is a promise to patients, but it is also a necessary
170. See News Release, Harris Interactive, Large Numbers of People Do Not Trust the Institutions
They Identify as Most Responsible for Drug Safety (Apr. 25, 2007), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/
news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=1216. The poll data on this issue shows, repeatedly, that this distrust
is quite strong. A Harris Interactive poll of United States adults, for example, found that
only 45 percent of people somewhat trust or very strongly trust the U.S. FDA. Only 27
percent of people somewhat or very strongly trust pharmaceutical companies. Only 20
percent of people somewhat or very strongly trust Congress. However, many more
people, a 58 percent majority, somewhat or very strongly trust doctors or other
professionals who prescribe drugs.
Id. The same poll found that most people do not believe that drug companies will ever release any data
about adverse reactions to their drugs.
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tool to open the door to the marketplace for drug and device companies.
This marketplace focus appears to have influenced both the collection of
data and how it is presented to the public. 171 Efficacy, as a concept, is
currently tainted in the public’s eye by its association with the
pharmaceutical industry and the FDA approval process. 172
The public has seen a number of examples in the press of unreliable
behavior by drug companies and researchers relating to the development
and use of effectiveness data. One extensively reported story concerned
a physician-scientist named Dr. Timothy Kuklo, a military surgeon at
Walter Reed Hospital. According to press reports, during his time at the
hospital, Dr. Kuklo was alleged to have received payments of more than
$850,000 from Medtronic, which manufactures Infuse, a bioengineered
bone-growth protein. 173 In addition, he appears to have falsified study
results to show that Infuse worked well, published the falsified results in
a prestigious journal, 174 listed another researcher as a co-author who had
never heard of the project, and failed to disclose his financial conflict of
interest to the journal prior to publication. 175 The manufacturers of
Celebrex used positive data to support a positive article that was
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA),
although they did not include the data from the same study that had less
positive results. 176 The manufacturer then submitted the full set of data
to the FDA, who found significant problems. 177 The ensuing problems
led to a class action securities fraud lawsuit against the manufacturer, as
its behavior had caused the price of its securities to decline. 178
The list of publicly reported types of drug company behavior that
reduce public trust is quite extensive. There has been public exposure of
“ghost-writing,” a practice in which highly regarded scientists sign their
171. MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2005), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/jul/15/thetruth-about-the-drug-companies/.
172. Harlan M. Krumholz & Joseph S. Ross, Relationships with the Drug Industry: More
Regulation, Greater Transparency, 338 BMJ b211 (2009), available at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/
content/full/338/feb03_2/b211 (analyzing Harris Interactive poll, supra note 170, and other studies
showing both the distrust and vulnerability of consumers and patients).
173. Barry Meier & Duff Wilson, Medical School Says Former Army Surgeon Hid Ties to
Medtronic, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2009, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/
business/15device.html.
174. Id. See also Timothy Kuklo, Recombinant Human Bone Morphogenetic Protein-2 for Grade
III Open Segmental Tibial Fractures from Combat Injuries in Iraq, 90-B J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 1068
(2008) (withdrawn by: J. Scott, Withdrawal of a Paper, 91-B J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 285, 286 (2009)).
175. Meier & Wilson, supra note 173.
176. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Pharmacia Corp., 554 F.3d 342, 344 (3d Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010).
177. Id. at 345.
178. Id. (discussing at length the data manipulation surrounding Celebrex).
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names to articles in medical journals without participating in the studies
or writing the articles later attributed to them. 179 Additionally,
researchers have not been consistently forthcoming about financial
conflicts of interest regarding the subject they are writing about, even
when journals require such disclosure as a condition for publication. 180
With CER, people are frightened by the possibility of the
manipulation of effectiveness data to justify rationing health care, but it
is the many known and widely publicized instances of data manipulation
that have led to this environment of distrust and presumptive
illegitimacy. Creating a system for collecting CER that ostensibly
protects it from the explicit consideration of cost, as the Coordinating
Council legislation does, will not make people trust CER. It will add to
the climate of distrust, because people assume cost is an unspoken and
powerful part of CER conclusions and recommendations. The current
CER system has the potential to create additional layers of opaque, costbased decision-making that can be added to the current NCD process.
IV. POLITICAL SELF-INTEREST AND MEDICARE
There is a widespread belief that it is politically damaging for
government to explicitly limit access to health care in order to save
money. 181 This belief may contribute to Congress’ tolerance of the
current NCD process, where CMS improperly takes cost into account
when determining the scope of coverage and does so without
transparency.
Congressional tolerance for the current NCD system, though harmful,
persists. Given the importance of health care to society 182 and given that
179. Joseph S. Ross et al., Guest Authorship and Ghostwriting in Publications Related to
Rofecoxib: A Case Study of Industry Documents From Rofecoxib Litigation, 299 JAMA 1800 (2008),
available at http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/abstract/299/15/1800 (examining documents that were
produced during discovery for a products liability case concerning rofecoxiband that showed the
prevalence of ghost writing along with a pattern of keeping this hidden).
180. See MERRILL GOOZNER, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, UNREVEALED: NONDISCLOSURE OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN FOUR LEADING MEDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC JOURNALS 2
(2004), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/unrevealed_final.pdf.
181. In support of this belief, a national poll from October 2009 found that nearly 80% of people
polled said they oppose restrictions on access to health care if treatments will not be covered because
they are too costly, not essential or have too little chance of success. See Gary Langer, Growing Health
Care Concerns Fuel Cautious Support for Change, ABCNEWS, Oct. 29, 2003, http://abcnews.go.com/
images/pdf/935a3HealthCare.pdf.
182. In support of this assertion, a recent poll found that 93% of Americans polled said it was
extremely or very important that their healthcare plan cover tests and treatments that they or their doctor
thought were necessary. Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority in U.S. Favors Healthcare Reform This Year,
GALLUP, July 14, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/121664/majority-favors-healthcare-reform-thisyear.aspx.
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healthcare spending is widely considered to be out of control, 183 it is
striking that a more aggressive system for defining public values and
allocating spending accordingly in Medicare has not been implemented.
Congress should demand that Medicare justify the cost of new medical
treatments that it wishes to provide its recipients. The health of the
Medicare population should be of paramount concern, and in the face of
finite resources, any change in how Medicare funding is allocated
should require an explanation as to how the change improves the
program. Political self-interest theory presumes that a government
official will make choices that maximize the goods he seeks and
minimize his harms. 184 Under this theory, Congress must be acting
under the belief that advocating for reduced healthcare expenditures
would harm this self-interest, and so the underlying truth of the matter
needs to be examined. There is substantial criticism of the political selfinterest theory that calls into question how accurate the theory is at
predicting or describing Congressional decision-making. 185
But,
assuming for the sake of argument that the theory is correct, the Oregon
healthcare system presents a counter-argument as to the effect of
rationing on political support. Oregon has transparent healthcare
rationing that is subject to public debate, and supporters of that system
do not appear to suffer political penalties.
A. Political Self-Interest: Is Rationing Risky?
In The Politics of Health Legislation: An Economic Perspective, 186
Paul Feldstein discusses in detail a theory of how political self-interest
functions in healthcare legislation. Feldstein posits that legislators are
essentially interested in their own self-interest and that if one can
ascertain the relevant types of legislative actions that are good or bad for
that self-interest, one can predict how Congress will behave. Central to
this premise is that legislators are only concerned with a narrow costbenefit analysis that pertains to their re-election, rather than a concern
over the costs and benefits of legislation to society. 187 This self-interest
functions within a political marketplace where political support
(campaign contributions, votes and volunteers) is traded for the benefits

183. Id. In this same poll, 52% of Americans polled said that controlling cost was the most
important goal of healthcare reform. Id.
184. See discussion infra notes 186–187 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 200–205 and accompanying text.
186. PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF HEALTH LEGISLATION: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
(3d ed. 2006).
187. Id. at 10.
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of legislation. 188
There are two main groups of people who seek to benefit from
legislation in this marketplace.
Population groups seek wealth
transfers. 189 Private sector corporations and industries seek legislation
that increases and protects their profitability, and protects them from
intrusive regulation. 190 A group needs to be motivated to act, and, if the
group is rational, this will occur when the effect of potential legislation
is great enough to justify the costs of organizing and participating in the
political process. 191 When a situation gives a group a rational
motivation to act, the group has developed a “concentrated interest” in
the political process. 192 Concentrated interests can be created by both
benefits and burdens of legislation and, because of this, a politician must
create benefits for the intended group without putting substantial
burdens on a different group who would then organize in opposition. 193
Thus, the ideal legislative action creates a highly visible benefit for at
least one group and a diffuse set of burdens that do not motivate any
other group to oppose it. 194
Using this theory, Medicare, as currently constructed, can be
described as an ideal legislative action because it generates substantial
political benefit with minimal risk. First, it provides a large, highly
visible benefit to its participants, many of whom would be foreclosed
from participation in the private market due to age or pre-existing
conditions, 195 and so would otherwise not have health insurance.
Second, it provides a benefit to the healthcare industry, whose revenues
have increased due to Medicare. 196 The funding of the program is
relatively diffuse. Money is primarily provided by people who work and
pay taxes, 197 and there are roughly 160 million employed people in the

188. Id.
189. Id. at 11. For example, the elderly seek the financial benefit from Medicare. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. Cost is a broad term that includes financial contributions, volunteer efforts, protests, etc.
The term is used to encompass all of the things one can do to influence the process that requires
expending one’s resources: time, money, influence, energy, etc.
192. Id.
193. Id. Funding allocations to one program that require taking money from another program can
also risk creating a concentrated interest in the group that is losing the benefit of financing. This
happens “[w]hen the financial commitments imposed on it [or demanded from it] require cutbacks in
other politically popular programs or necessitate a tax increase.” Id. at 154.
194. Id. at 11. The preference for creating diffuse burdens would explain why legislators would
rather borrow to fund a program than tax current constituents. The cost is shifted to the distant future.
195. Before Medicare was enacted, people over sixty-five were mostly shut out of the private
market for health insurance. Fox, supra note 34, at 585.
196. FELDSTEIN, supra note 186, at 3.
197. Id.
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United States sharing this burden. 198 The program shifts resources from
these workers to the two groups that benefit. The workers funding
Medicare receive a promise that they will benefit in the future as a
Medicare beneficiary. The risk of any substantial increase in the cost of
this future care is shifted to future generations, who will pay for it with
their payroll taxes. 199
Medicare’s structure creates an incentive for Congress to maintain or
increase the cost of the program, up to a certain point. The large base of
taxpayers who support Medicare can absorb a small rise in the payroll
tax without experiencing enough discomfort to justify opposing the
program. If this same amount was cut directly from Medicare, both its
participants and the companies that benefit from providing healthcare
services would be more likely to have a concentrated interest in the
legislation, justifying political action. Overt cost control over Medicare
will only become politically necessary when the payroll tax is raised
high enough to create an incentive for organized political opposition to
Medicare. If CMS’s current efforts to control costs are sufficient to
keep Medicare funding below this level, the efforts successfully protect
congressional self-interest. Congress would lack motivation to intrude
on CMS’s NCD process, even if not properly conducted under the
Medicare Act.
The narrow view of Congressional self-interest described here has
been challenged, 200 both in terms of the accuracy of its descriptive or
predictive claims and in the underlying soundness of its central theme.
This theory of self-interest is essentially meant to be descriptive, yet
fails to take into account numerous political actions that do not fit its
model. 201 For example, there are a number of regulatory regimes for
public health and safety that exist, yet, under this theory, they should not
because they provide diffuse benefits and concentrated costs.202
Furthermore, this self-interest theory fails to account for the consistent
impact of personal ideology on legislators’ voting behavior. 203 Second,
there is substantial support for a contrary view of the political system,
198. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY: UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS 4 (2010), available at
http://ssa.gov/pubs/10024.html.
199. FELDSTEIN, supra note 186, at 154.
200. Jerry L. Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 19 (Daniel A. Farber eds. et al., 2010)
(fully discussing political self-interest and its flaws). Repeating here the arguments against the narrow
view of Congressional self-interest would be outside the scope of this Article, yet the topic, in all detail,
is of great importance to the debate about how to ration health care in the United States system.
201. Id. at 25.
202. Id.
203. Id. (as empirical studies have shown).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss1/1

42

Fox: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF COST: MEDICARE DECISIONS, TRANSPARENCY AND PUB
FOX FINAL FORMAT 2

2010]

2/11/2011 3:40:42 PM

THE HIDDEN ROLE OF COST

43

one where the shared, communal goal of the political process is to create
a collective definition of public values and where Congress is a willing
participant. 204 In this view, the work that voters undertake to participate
in the system, such as political organization and education, are actually
perceived as benefits that people seek, rather than burdens or costs that
are only reluctantly undertaken. 205 Increasing public participation in
healthcare resource-allocation decisions would increase the opportunity
for voters to have this benefit.
B. Oregon: An Example of Political Viability 206
In 1987, Neil Goldschmidt, the governor of Oregon, appointed a
working group to determine what Oregon’s Medicaid program should
cover. 207 This group made a series of findings, 208 the first being that all
Oregon citizens should have access to a basic level of care. Second, it
found that there must be a process to define what the basic level of care
is, and, further, that this “process must be based on criteria that are
publicly debated, reflect a consensus of social values, and consider the
good of society as a whole.” 209
The Oregon Health Services Commission (the Commission) was
created in 1989 210 to create a list of medical benefits to be included in
the “basic” level of care. The Commission crafts this list through a
biennial process that “represent[s] an unusual marriage of health
services research and deliberative democracy,” 211 including holding an
extensive series of public meetings, as well as analyzing scientific
204. Id. (citing Arthur Maas, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1983); Cass R. Sunstein,
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal
Interference with Private Preferences, U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986)).
205. Id.
206. Oregon’s approach to health care and cost is described in this Article only for the purpose of
providing an example of sustained electorate support of a government healthcare system that directly
addresses cost. Much more can, and has, been said about Oregon. For an in-depth discussion, see
Leonard M. Fleck, Just Caring: Oregon, Health Care Rationing, and Informed Democratic
Deliberation, 19 J. MED. & PHIL. 367 (1994); Somnath Saha et al., Giving Teeth to ComparativeEffectiveness Research—The Oregon Experience, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e18 (2010). See also
RATIONING AMERICA’S MEDICAL CARE: THE OREGON PLAN AND BEYOND (Martin A. Strosberg et al.
eds., 1992). For a particularly critical analysis, see Jonathan Oberlander et al., Rationing Medical Care:
Rhetoric and Reality in the Oregon Health Plan, 164 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1583 (2001).
207. OFFICE OF MED. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, OR. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., OREGON HEALTH
PLAN: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 1 (2006), available at http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/healthplan/
data_pubs/ohpoverview0706.pdf.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2.
210. Id. at 4.
211. Oberlander et al., supra note 206, at 1586.
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studies. The Commission’s list, and the subsequent limitations on care
provided to Oregon Medicaid recipients, has led to substantial
controversy on a number of occasions since the first list was
implemented in 1993, and yet the system is still intact. For example, the
list specifically does not cover diagnostic or curative care for patients
who have a 5% or less chance of survival for five years (though it covers
palliative care). 212 This means that Oregon does not provide all possible
treatment choices to people who are dying and have very little chance to
live, which has attracted intense criticism.
This exclusion garnered extensive attention during the illness of
Barbara Wagner. Wagner, suffering from a recurrence of her lung
cancer in August 2008, was denied coverage for a cancer treatment
because it was not included on the list as she had less than a 5% chance
of surviving for more than five years. Wagner was offered coverage for
palliative care, including, by implication, access to physician-assisted
suicide. 213 This struck some as being exceptionally cruel. The decision
resulted in immense criticism, particularly on the Internet, where the
authors of the list were accused of preferring to kill patients rather than
treating them. 214 Shortly after coverage was denied, Wagner received
the treatment as a donation from the drug manufacturer. 215 The
treatment failed, and Wagner died in October 2008.
Even in the face of this controversy regarding the Commission’s
specific choices, the process Oregon uses to determine the health care it
will cover is tolerated, and perhaps approved of, by its citizens. In 2008,
54% of Oregon residents felt that Oregon was doing a good job in
assuring access to health care, an increase of 11% from 2006. 216 There
is also evidence that promoting healthcare rationing is not harming
political futures there. John Kitzhaber, an emergency medicine
specialist and Oregon state senator in 1987, was the person who
originally proposed that Oregon ration health care in order to provide
basic care to more people. He became Oregon’s governor in 1995, after
212. OR. HEALTH SERVS. COMM’N, PRIORITIZED LIST OF HEALTH SERVICES SI-1 (2008),
available at http://www.oregon.gov/OHPPR/HSC/docs/Jan08Plist_B.pdf.
213. Susan Donaldson James, Death Drugs Cause Uproar in Oregon: Terminally Ill Denied
Drugs for Life, but Can Opt for Suicide, ABCNEWS, Aug. 6, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/
story?id=5517492&page=1.
214. Jeffrey Lord, The Ultimate Cost Saver, THE AM. SPECTATOR, Aug. 18, 2009,
http://spectator.org/archives/2009/08/18/the-ultimate-cost-saver.
215. Rick Attig, Sensationalizing a Sad Case Cheats the Public of Sound Debate, THE
OREGONIAN,
Nov.
29,
2008,
http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2008/11/
sensationalizing_a_sad_case_ch.html.
216. Press Release, Or. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., State Releases 2008 Population Survey, Feb. 23,
2009,
available
at
http://www.oregon.gov/DAS/OPB/docs/PopSurv/2008OPS/
OPS_2008_Press_Release.pdf.
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the first Oregon list of covered services had been implemented. He
served from 1995 to 2003. 217
V. CHANGING MEDICARE
This Part contains a proposal for congressional amendment of the
Medicare Act to allow CMS to explicitly consider cost when making
NCDs. This proposal will give CMS both the power to better control
cost and the obligation to be forthright as it does so. This change will
increase transparency, allow for open debate and hopefully lead to a
more mature, informed process that will ultimately be successful in
controlling healthcare costs throughout the United States. CMS and
Congress have created a process for making NCDs that allows for a high
degree of public participation. Cost-based rationing of a new treatment
should be debated within this existing process, which only requires
minor changes to ensure that the debate takes place in a timely and
informed manner.
A. Changing “Reasonable and Necessary”
The original Medicare Act requires CMS to make no payment “for
any expenses which are incurred for items and services which are not
reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or
injury.” 218 In Hays v. Sibelius, a recent federal appellate decision
interpreting this language, Judge Tatel, writing for the majority, read this
language to mean that “reasonable” is used here as a modifier of “items
and services,” and not of “expenses.” 219 This reading is consistent with
the legislative history of the Medicare Act.
Consider the following way of changing this language to allow
Medicare to consider cost: “for any expenses which are unreasonable
and which are incurred for items and services which are not reasonable
and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury.” The
purpose of adding the language “which are unreasonable” as a modifier
of “expenses” is to allow CMS to make a full inquiry as to the
217. See John Kitzhaber, http://www.johnkitzhaber.com/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006).
219. Hays v. Sebelius, 589 F.3d 1279, 1282–83 (3d Cir. 2009). This recent appellate decision in
the DC Circuit analyzes the language of this section of the Medicare Act. The language of the relevant
section of the Medicare Act reads: “no payment may be made . . . for any expenses which are incurred
for items and services . . . which are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of
illness or injury.” Id. at 1280 (quoting § 1395y(a)(1)(A)). The Court stated that Congress could have
inserted the word “and” after “services,” but chose not to, and thus did not have reasonable as a modifier
of “expenses” but instead as a modifier for “items and services.” Id. at 1282.
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reasonableness of an expense in terms of its effect on the cost of
Medicare, without impairing its ability to consider whether an item or
treatment is reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of
illness or injury. It is important to restate that, to some degree, CMS
already makes the inquiries about reasonable cost envisioned here, and it
is impossible to imagine a political situation that would not generate
pressure on it to continue doing so. The goal of the statutory change is
to empower CMS to create a more transparent, rational, and fair process.
The case study in Part II.D of this Article presents an example of how
the proposed statutory change would alter the NCD process. Prior to
CMS issuing a new NCD for implantable cardiac defibrillators (ICD),
after it received the results of the study calling for an expansion of ICD
coverage, the worst-case cost scenario for funding this new NCD was an
initial outlay of $150 billion for Medicare, with annual costs of up to $8
billion each year thereafter. Under the proposed Medicare language, this
great expense would present a question as to whether it was reasonable
for Medicare to spend this money, even if the ICD was “reasonable and
necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury.” The
language does not dictate the answer, but rather, allows for the question
to be asked openly.
It has been argued that the word “reasonable” in the current Medicare
Act should be interpreted to already include what it is reasonable to pay
for, at least going so far as to allow CMS the right to consider cost
effectiveness of a new treatment. 220 The legislative history discussed in
Part II makes it clear that Congress did not envision this. The cost of the
healthcare system was not a problem in 1965, and as a result, controlling
cost was not a pressing concern that needed to be considered in
Medicare’s language. Furthermore, it was an anathema to the medical
establishment to give the federal government the power to determine
cost-worthiness of physician-prescribed treatments. 221 It would not have
supported the law without having its autonomy protected, which is what
the Medicare Act clearly did. 222

220. See Michael S. Kolber, Opacity and Cost Effectiveness Analysis in Medicare Coverage
Decisions: Health Policy Encounters Administrative Law, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 515 (2009) (Kolber
argues that the language is broad enough to encompass a cost effectiveness analysis). But see supra Part
II; Hays, 589 F.3d at 1282–83 (declining to address the issue of whether CMS may consider cost in its
coverage decisions, but making clear that coverage and cost are two separate steps of the coverage
process).
221. Supra Part II.
222. The language of the law made this position clear. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006) (“Prohibition
against any Federal interference . . . Nothing in this subchapter [42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq.] shall be
construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the
practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided . . . .”).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss1/1

46

Fox: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF COST: MEDICARE DECISIONS, TRANSPARENCY AND PUB
FOX FINAL FORMAT 2

2010]

2/11/2011 3:40:42 PM

THE HIDDEN ROLE OF COST

47

Even if a strained reading of the language could justify allowing a
narrow cost effectiveness analysis to be part of an NCD process, 223 this
consideration will be insufficient to solve Medicare’s problems of cost
and lack of transparency. Cost effectiveness analysis is not, by itself,
going to stop out-of-control spending on health care. Two questions
remain persistently unanswered with even the best cost effectiveness
data. First, when is something effective enough to justify paying for it?
Second, if inflation of medical costs is controlled, there will be finite
resources for Medicare. In the face of finite resources, when are existing
medical costs important enough to continue funding, rather than shifting
resources to a new, effective treatment? The new language proposed
here is meant to encompass the power to answer both of these questions.
Furthermore, merely allowing CMS to narrowly consider cost as would
occur in this scenario does nothing to compel it to disclose when it has
done so, thus failing to improve transparency. If there is political
pressure on CMS to hide its cost-based decision-making from the public,
only a strong public commitment to transparency will lead to any
meaningful change.
B. Changing the NCD Process to Ensure Transparency and Public
Debate About Cost
The NCD process was created through a combination of federal law
and CMS actions. If Medicare is amended as suggested, minor changes
need to be made in the federal law governing this process to incorporate
the new role of cost, and to protect the transparency of any cost-based
decisions that are made.
The NCD process is controlled by its own federal law, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395y(l). The process is exempt from the notice and comment process
of the Administrative Procedures Act that would ordinarily apply to a
similar agency undertaking. 224 Furthermore, an NCD is not reviewable
223. In Kolber’s reading of the Medicare Act, this is as broad a role for cost as he is able to find in
the language. While it is debatable as to whether the modern concept of “cost effectiveness,” as
embodied in the CMS regulations discussed in Part II, even existed in 1965, it may be fair to read
“reasonable” to include some ability to exclude wasteful procedures from coverage. The source of the
Medicare language, however, is the typical health care insurance policy language of 1965, and, as
described in Part II, there are no contemporaneous judicial interpretations of this contract language that
support reading this power into this language. In Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, Eskridge has a
theory that would allow for a changing interpretation of a durable statute like Medicare, and it is
persuasive. Problems of legitimacy and transparency still need to be addressed, and that, in turn, seems
to call for a more explicit statutory framework for this undertaking than somehow finding that this
power has developed, organically, in the Medicare Act.
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(f)(1)(A) (2006) (exempting the
NCD process from the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006)).
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by administrative law judges, who ordinarily have jurisdiction to review
individual Medicare coverage denials. 225
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(l), the language of the first subsection,
entitled “(1) Factors and evidence used in making national coverage
determinations,” states: “The Secretary shall make available to the
public the factors considered in making national coverage
determinations of whether an item or service is reasonable and
necessary.” 226 Currently, specific factors are not enumerated in this
subsection. This language should be changed to compel the disclosure
of cost concerns, thereby encouraging the transparent process called for
in this Article, when such concerns are a factor in making an NCD. The
first subsection quoted above should be entitled (A) and a new
subsection (B) should be inserted, stating: “When cost of a proposed
medical treatment is a factor in making a national coverage
determination, the Secretary shall, in a timely manner, disclose that this
factor is being considered, and, after a national coverage determination
is issued, any effect it had on that determination.”
Section (l) further delineates certain procedures that must be followed
when issuing NCDs, including when CMS must explain its reasoning.
The timing of this process could create barriers to encouraging robust
public debate about the role cost plays in an NCD. Subsections 3(A)
and (B) of Section (l) require that a proposed NCD be made available
for a public comment period lasting thirty days. 227 These comments
must then be addressed in the final NCD, which must be issued within
sixty days of the end of the public comment period. 228 It is only as CMS
issues its final decision that Subsection 3(C) requires CMS to “make
available to the public the clinical evidence and other data used in
making such a decision when the decision differs from the
recommendations of the Medicare Coverage Advisory Committee.” 229
Prior to the public comment period, it may be impossible for CMS to
know exactly how, or if, its NCD will differ from an Advisory
Committee recommendation. However, if the recommendation has
already been issued, CMS should know if it intends to re-examine it. If
a factor in considering re-examining a recommendation is cost concerns
created by the scope of the coverage recommendation, this needs to be
made clear in the public notice posted about the proposed NCD. In the
case study described in Part II of this Article, the NCD for ICDs was
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

42 C.F.R. §§ 405.732, 405.860 (2010).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(l)(1) (West 2010).
§ 1395y(l)(B).
§ 1395y(l)(C).
§ 1395y(l)(3)(C)(iii).
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issued after the Medicare Coverage Advisory Committee recommended
coverage consistent with the FDA marketing approval, and,
subsequently, CMS declined to follow this recommendation. It is likely
that the difference between the coverage recommended by the Medicare
Coverage Advisory Committee and the coverage embodied in the NCD
was substantially influenced by cost concerns. The change proposed
here would allow the public to comment on cost concerns created by the
scope of the recommendation before the final NCD is issued.
Furthermore, before or as the public comment period begins, the
public needs access to more information about CMS’s decision-making
process than may be contained in the text of a proposed NCD. The
current language of subsections (3)(A) and (B) call for a public
comment period that is triggered by publication of a draft of the
proposed NCD. This should be amended to include substantive
guidance for CMS as to the type of information it must release in
addition to the actual content of the proposed NCD itself so that the
public can make informed comments in response to the role cost has
played in the draft NCD.
The United States has not grappled with open rationing of health care
in this way, and it would be unrealistic to expect the process to occur
without error. It should be expected that mistakes and injustices will
occur, especially concerning technologies whose future usefulness and
cost are fluid and difficult to predict. In anticipation of these problems,
Congress should require CMS to revisit NCDs when substantial
evidence of error or injustice is presented. To some degree, CMS has
shown itself to be open to this, as can be seen from its willingness to
modify of its original NCD about ICDs. 230
VI. CONCLUSION
Nearly a half-century has passed since America created Medicare.
Since that time, the cost of medical care has emerged as one of the most
challenging problems facing this nation. When Medicare was created, it
was structured to protect the physician’s power to decide what was in
the best interests of the patient, without regard to the potentially ruinous
cost to the nation this would create. The nature and culture of the
healthcare system has changed dramatically since 1965, yet the
Medicare Act has remained chained to an outmoded premise that
aggregate medical costs should not be considered when making
coverage decisions. This dangerous statutory prohibition has forced the

230. See supra Part II.D.
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contemporary Medicare program to consider cost as best it can, but in a
closeted manner, without the benefit of public debate.
This Article proposed reforming the Medicare Act so that regulators
are not only empowered but also compelled to consider the cost of new
medical treatments when they make program-wide coverage decisions,
and that they be required to disclose how cost factored into these
decisions. Consistent with the goals of healthcare reform, these changes
will allow Medicare to improve the quality of care its recipients receive,
reduce the out-of-control costs of the program, and increase the public’s
ability to participate in making these difficult decisions. These changes
are likely to be politically difficult to achieve, yet the current healthcare
crisis and the extraordinary future financial problems require bold
change.
The problem of cost does not rest solely within Medicare, and is,
instead, widespread throughout the healthcare system. Given the strain
on resources created by the ever-increasing cost of funding the system,
how could pressure not be widespread? In particular, cost creates
powerful pressure on the legal structures that regulate this industry, a
pressure that can distort everything from insurance company benefit
decisions to recommendations regarding preventive testing. Legal
scholars need to do more to analyze the effects of this pressure and to
help devise regulatory structures for the new healthcare laws that will
enable a more honest, transparent, and effective system. Cost will not
disappear, but it needs to be addressed directly. Precedence for this
undertaking can be found in the legal literature concerning ERISA
preemption from the 1990s, where the cost-saving motives of the
insurance industry were openly discussed. This discussion contributed
to widespread legal change, including the creation of external review
boards and state ombudsman offices as well as the development of
patient-protecting Department of Labor regulations for employer-based
health insurance benefit disputes. The goal could never be forcing thirdparty payers to make benefit decisions without an eye on potential costs,
but rather to enable patients to have access to the rights guaranteed to
them in coverage contracts and the changes focused on this form of
empowerment.
The work of academics searching for the North Star to serve as a
guide to an ethical, just, and affordable healthcare system is important,
and it justifiably occupies much energy. However, the current
environment is one where incremental change is likely to remain the
norm, and where problems of cost, access, and quality are unlikely to be
resolved in one fell swoop. It is in this non-ideal world that the values
of transparency, maturity, and honesty need to be defended as these
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values are constantly threatened by the problem of cost.
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